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ABSTRACT 
An Assessment of Dual Audit Effect and Contagious Effect on the Audit Quality of 
Non-Big N CPA Firms for Chinese Companies in Different Markets 
by 
WANGMeixin 
Master of Philosophy 
External auditor is an independent agent to provide assurance about the validity of 
financial statements prepared by management to enhance the reliability of 
information in financial reports. As such, audit quality has long been a concern for 
all stakeholders and is a topic of on-going research interest. In China, the dual audit 
requirement for AB share companies and AH share companies started in 2001 was 
abolished in 2007 and 2010 respectively. This study attempts to examine whether 
there are dual audit effect and contagious effect on the audit quality of non-Big N 
audit firms for A share companies in different markets. I focus on non-Big N audit 
firms since the audit quality of these firms are of greater concern. Using data from 
2001 to 2012, I compare the audit quality of A share companies that also have B (or 
H) shares ((AB/H) with the audit quality of pure A share companies to test whether 
there is a dual audit effect on the audit quality of A-share financial statements. I also 
compare AB/H share companies which hire only non-Big N auditors with those 
ABIH share companies who hire non-Big N domestic auditors and Big N 
international auditors to test the existence of contagious effect on the audit quality of 
A-share companies. My findings indicate that dual audit does improve the audit 
quality of non-Big N audit firms for A share companies. However, there was mixed 
evidences on the contagious effect using different measures of audit quality. This 
study contributes to the literature on enhancing our understanding of the 
determinants of audit quality in China. It can also provide policy makers in emerging 
economies some useful evidence on ways to improve audit quality. 
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An Assessment of Dual Audit Effect and Contagious Effect on the Audit Quality 
of Non-Big N CPA Firms for Chinese Companies in Different Markets 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Financial statements are used to provide users including shareholders, creditors, and 
regulatory bodies with information regarding the business operation and financial 
position of companies. However, users of financial statements may have doubts 
about the integrity and objectivity of management who prepare the financial 
statements. External auditors, as an independent agent to provide assurance about 
the quality of financial statements, can help enhance the credibility of information in 
financial statements and consequently mitigate information risk. Considering the 
importance of independent audits, non-Big N audit quality has long been a concern 
for all stakeholders, especially the audit quality for listed firms because of its impact 
on investors and society. As such, audit quality is a topic of on-going research 
interest. Audit quality is defined as the probability that an auditor will both discover 
and report a breach in the client's accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981). 
This study is also motivated by the emphasis of audit quality improvement in China 
in recent years. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is now attempting 
to adjust the structure imbalance in the Chinese capital market. In China, many 
companies still heavily rely on indirect· financing from financial institutions like 
banks instead of direct capital raising from investors in the capital market. 
According to Guo (2012), the Chairman of CSRC, the capital raised through 
security market consists of only 20% of the capital raised by Chinese companies. 
Due to the high reliance on debt capital from commercial banks, small and medium 
sized companies often encounter difficulties in financing, because banks often 
hesitate to make loans to small and medium-sized companies due to their limited 
ability to maintain a sound accounting system and relatively high loan risk. 
Consequently, many of these firms seek to list in foreign markets to obtain capital. 
For example, in 2010, among the 123 companies producing solar cells, 16 of them 
chose to be listed in foreign market to raise capital (Xu eta!., 2012). To attract some 
of these small and medium-sized companies back to the Chinese market and adjust 
the structure imbalance in Chinese capital market, CSRC attempts to stimulate the 
investment enthusiasm in the Chinese capital market (Guo, 2012). One of its 
strategies is to build investor's confidence in the Chinese capital market by 
providing better investor protection and improvement in the quality of information 
disclosure. Audit quality could play a very important role in enhancing the quality of 
information disclosure. Interestingly, in 2012, Premier Wen emphasized the 
importance of audit quality as he asked auditing bodies to reveal in a timely manner 
and resolve effectively various underlying financial risks in the economy (People's 
daily online, 20 12). Quality audits can reduce those risks. Because of the 
significance of audit quality in the Chinese market, it is important to examine the 
factors that could affect auditor's audit quality. 
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Additionally, in May 2014, the Ministry of Finance in China issued the Provisional 
Regulations on Cross-border Audit Services of CPA Firms (consultative draft). 1 The 
proposal precludes non-PRC CPA firms from providing audit services to Chinese 
companies listed overseas and enterprises registered overseas but with operating 
entities in China. My research can provide insights into the influence of such 
restrictions of non-PRC CPA firms audit services to Chinese companies on the audit 
quality of the Chinese market. 
This study attempts to examine the influence of the dual audit effect on the audit 
quality of non-Big N audit firms for A shares companies and the contagious effect of 
having Big N international auditors on domestic auditors' work. In contrast to prior 
studies which focus on the audit quality of Big N auditors, I focus on the audit 
quality of non-Big N audit firms because the audit quality of these firms is of greater 
concern. In this thesis, the Big N refers to the largest international accounting firms 
in China during my sample period (2001-2012), including PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Arthur Anderson and.BDO. 
According to the most updated ranking of CPA firms in China issued by CICPA, 
1 The proposed regulations apply to the audits of Chinese enterprises listed overseas and enterprises 
registered overseas but with operating entities in China, including both !PO audit and regular audit. 
Non-PRC CPA firms which audit the financial statements of Chinese Enterprises listed overseas and 
enterprises registered overseas but with operating entities in China according to the regulations in the 
overseas listing location must cooperate with PRC CPA firms qualified for performing listed-
company audits in China or CPA firms listed in the Information of the First 100 CPA Firms in the 
Comprehensive Assessment issued by CICPA last year. The non-PRC CPA firms are responsible for 
issuing audit report and will bear the audit responsibility. The audit reports issued by the non-PRC 
CPAs have no legal effect in China. Additionally, non-PRC CPA firms are prohibited from carrying 
out audits for enterprises registered overseas but with operating entities in China through provisional 
license arrangements. 
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BDO ranked No. 5 in the comprehensive assessment while KPMG ranked No. 6. 
BDO consistently ranked high in recent years and is comparable in operating 
income to Big 4 in China.2 In addition, BDO entered Chinese market early in 1997 
and gained reputation in providing high quality services comparable to Big 4. Thus, 
it is reasonable to include BDO in Big N for the tests of dual audit effect and 
contagious effect. Big N auditors have global reputation in hiring talented 
employees with good communication and professional competence. Big N CPA 
firms provide their people with high-level standardized training and apply 
standardized audit methodologies worldwide. They are usually perceived to be 
associated with higher audit quality compared with non-Big N auditors. The dual 
audit for A -share firms that also have B (or H) shares listed provides a unique 
opportunity for me to test the dual audit effect by comparing the audit quality of A-
share financial statements for firms with A share only with AB/H share firms. The 
unique dual audit policy (one auditor for A share and one for B (or H) share 
financial statements) also makes it possible to test the contagious effect of large 
auditors by comparing the audit quality of A share financial statements for AB/H 
share firms which hire to those which do not hire a Big N international auditor, since 
both the domestic and international auditors provide audit service to the same client 
2 In 2012, the ranking of CPA firms by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) 
is: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (!), KPMG (6), Ernst & Young (4), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2) and 
BDO (5) (CICPA, 2013). RSM China certified public accountants ranked No. 3 in 2012, but RSM 
entered China market late and did not cover the whole sample period. The ranking is a 
comprehensive one primarily based on annual revenue along with other factors like the number of 
CPAs and any discipline or punishment received during the year. 
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at the same time. My setting eliminates many confounding factors associated with 
cross-sectional and time series analyses because I only compare the audit quality of 
A-share auditors under the same institutional environment. 
My sample consists of Main-Board listed A-share firms on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2012. I divide these firms into three groups 
for my tests. The first group includes firms that issue only A shares and hire non-Big 
N domestic auditors. My second group includes firms that issue both A shares and B 
(or H) shares (AB/H share firms) and hire a non-Big N a domestic auditor and a 
non-Big N international auditor. AB/H share firms having a non-Big N domestic 
auditor and a Big N auditor form the third group. I examine the dual audit effect by 
comparing the audit quality of A-share financial statements for firms in the first and 
second groups, i.e. pure A share firms hiring non-Big N domestic auditors and AB/H 
share firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors. The 
contagious effect is tested by a comparison of audit quality of A share financial 
statements between the second and third groups i.e. AB/H share firms with non-Big 
N domestic and international auditors and AB/H share firms with a non-Big N 
domestic auditor and a Big N international auditor. 
I use the auditors' propensity to issue modified audit opinion and earning response 
coefficient as proxies for audit quality. I find consistent evidence that dual audit 
improves audit quality using bpth measurements. Mixed evidence was found 
regarding contagious effect of Big N international auditor on non-Big N domestic 
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auditor's audit quality. No significant impact of hiring Big N international auditors 
is found on the non-Big N domestic auditor's propensity to modifY audit opinion. 
However, my empirical tests reveal a positive and significant association between 
hiring a Big N international auditor and investors' responsiveness to earnings 
changes (i.e. earnings response coefficient) in the A share financial statements 
audited by a non-Big N domestic auditor. 
The findings on the dual audit effect and contagious effect for non-Big N audit 
quality of Chinese companies in different markets contribute to the literature in 
enhancing our understanding about the determinants of audit quality for listed 
companies in Chinese market. This study also provides evidence on the existence of 
Big N auditors' contagious effect on the non-Big N auditors regarding audit quality 
when they work closely. It also provides policy makers some hard evidence on ways 
to improve audit quality in China and as a result enhance the institutional 
enviromnent in the Chinese capital market. 
I discuss the related institutional background in the next chapter. In the third chapter, 
I review some prior related research studies. I develop my hypotheses in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 shows my research design, in which I discuss my test models in detail. 
The empirical results of the main tests as well as sensitivity tests are reported in the 
sixth chapter. The final chapter concludes my findings. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
This thesis studies Chinese companies in three different markets, namely, AB share 
companies, AH share companies and pure A share companies. The nature of the 
audit for these companies as it relates to this research is explained below. 
2.1 AB share companies 
AB share companies issue two sets of shares, A shares and B shares. A shares are 
offered to domestic investors in China while B shares are offered to foreign 
investors.3 AB share companies are not subject to cross listing. Both shares are listed 
in China's securities market. In 1992, there was a total of 18 firms with B shares. B 
share market has experienced rapid development since then. In 2012, there are 1 07 
B-share companies, among which 85 companies issue both A shares and B shares. B 
share market is established primarily to provide Chinese companies with an 
alternative international financial channel. Chinese companies could raise capital 
from foreign investors without cross listing in foreign markets. So B shares are also 
called domestically listed foreign shares. Therefore, it is necessary for these 
companies to provide their company information to foreign investors. In September 
1992, the Ministry of Finance and State Commission for Restrncturingjointly issued 
the Provisional Regulation for CPAs in Providing Services for Pilot Joint-Stock 
Enterprises which guides the audit of companies with B shares and companies listed 
3 In Feb 19, 2001, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and CSRC jointly issued the 
Notice on Issues Related to Individual Domestic Residents' Investment in Domestically Listed Foreign 
Shares. B share market started to be open to Chinese residents from 200 I. 
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m foreign markets. The regulations reqmre that the financial statements of 
companies · with B shares have to be audited by Chinese Certified Public 
Accountants (CPAs) and Chinese CPAs have to issue an audit report in accordance 
with Chinese GAAP. In addition, to communicate information to foreign investors 
or upon the requirements of overseas regulatory authorities, these companies should 
normally employ an international audit firm to carry out additional audits based on 
international auditing standards and issue audit reports accordingly. This effectively 
means that AB share companies are subject to a dual audit. The international audit 
firms employed for B share companies should have a resident representative office 
in China. The CPA firm performing A share audit and the international audit firm 
could cooperate with each other during the audit, but they have to issue their audit 
reports separately. However, the dual audit requirement is not mandatory until 2001, 
although most companies chose to have dual audit before 2001. CSRC made the 
dual audit requirement mandatory in 2001 and gave detailed guidelines on dual audit 
in The Content and Format of Information Disclosure for Companies with Public 
Offering No. 2-The Content and Format of Annual Report (2001 revised version). 
According to the requirement, in addition to the audit by a domestic auditor, the 
financial statements of AB share companies should also be audited by an 
international CPA firm using International Auditing Standards. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Finance and the International Accounting Standards Board 
jointly made a press conference and announced that the new accounting and auditing 
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standards that would come into effect in 2007 and the implementation of the new 
standards would achieve substantial convergence of accounting and auditing 
standards in China with the International Accounting and Auditing Standards 
(Huang, 2006). Due to the convergence of the accounting standards, the CSRC 
issued the Notice on the Relevant Issue about the Auditing of the Companies that 
Issue the Domestically Listed B-shares (2007) which effectively abolishes the 
mandatory dual audit requirement for AB share companies because of the substantial 
convergence of accounting and auditing standards and the desire to save audit fees 
for companies. Starting from the fiscal year ended in 2007, AB share companies no 
longer need to have two sets audit reports, although some have continued to do so 
on a voluntary basis. 
2. 2 AH Share Companies 
Unlike AB share companies, AH share companies are subject to cross listing in both 
Mainland China·and the Hong Kong securities markets and issue A shares and H 
shares respectively. According to the listing rules in Mainland China and Hong 
Kong, AH share companies have to prepare two sets of financial ·statements and 
have them audited by auditors according to the respective requirements and 
standards in each market until 2010. This means that prior to 2010, AH-share 
companies have to prepare. two sets of financial statements in accordance with 
Chinese GAAP and Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (or International 
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Financial Reporting Standards) respectively and have them audited by domestic 
auditors and auditors in Hong Kong in accordance with the respective auditing 
standards. Thus, like AB share companies, AH share companies are also subject to 
dual audit, although the auditors involved could be different. 
In 2009, however, the Ministry of Finance and CSRC jointly issued the Pilot 
Program for CPA firms to engage in H-share Audit(Pilot Program) under which 
twelve CPA firms in China were allowed to perform audit service for H share firms. 
To ensure the quality of the pilot H share audit, the Pilot Program sets six 
requirements for CPA firms which want to apply for the H share audit qualification. 
First, applicants must be qualified to audit securities and futures business activities. 
Second, operational income in 2008 should not be ,less than 300 million (RMB) 
among which income from audit services cannot be less than 200 million and 
operating income from auditing securities activities should not be less than 50 
million or maintain 30 or more listed companies as audit clients. Third, Chinese 
CPAs in the applicants' firm should not be less than 400 and among which at least 
300 of them qualified as CPAs through public examination. Fourth, no one 
shareholder or partner obtains more than 25% ownership in the CPA firms. Fifth, 
applicants have established and maintained a sound corporate governance, quality 
control and internal control system. Sixth, the applicants must either have a member 
firm in Hong Kong or belong to the same international CPA firms as a Hong Kong 
audit firm. The final list is generated by Ministry of Finance and CSRC via 
10 
examination and verification, field visit and recommendations. The twelve Chinese 
auditors' qualification to audit H shares effectively means that the dual audit 
requirement for AH share companies becomes no longer mandatory following the 
Joint Statement on the Alignment of Accounting Standards for Mainland Enterprises 
and Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards in 2007 (CASC and HKICPA, 
2007). This indicates that from the fiscal year ended 2010, AH share companies can 
choose to have only one set of financial statements prepared in accordance with the 
accounting standards in Mainland China and engage one of the twelve mainland 
CPA firms mentioned above to audit their financial statements using the auditing 
standards in Mainland China. However, as of 2012, among the 82 AH-share 
companies, 57 companies still choose to have two sets of financial statements and 
two auditors for their financial reports, one domestic Chinese auditor and one Hong 
Kong auditor. 
2.3 Pure A Share Companies 
Pure A share companies are listed only in Chinese stock market, either on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Only one· set of financial 
statements and an audit report by a domestic auditor are required to be prepared for 
these companies. To ensure quality, CPA firms must have a special license to be able 
to audit listed companies in China. To be qualified to audit listed companies in 
China, a CPA firm has to be legally formed for more than 3 years and maintain 
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sound quality control, internal management system and professional ethics. These 
CPA firms must have at least 120 Chinese CPAs and not less than 80 of them 
qualified through the unified nationwide qualification examination. At least 60 of 
those 80 CPAs need to be qualified and have continuous practice for five years or 
more. The operating income should not be less than 50 million, among which at 
least 40 million are from audit services. It is also required that an audit firm for 
listed companies in China should be composed of not less than 25 partners and more 
than half of them have three-year or longer practice in this firm. In 2012, 54 CPA 
firms were qualified to audit listed companies in the Chinese stoc.k market. Needless 
to say, these are the better CPA firms in China. An example of qualified audit report 
respectively for AB, AH and pure A share firms is attached in Appendix 2. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
In this chapter, a comprehensive review of prior studies related to this thesis is 
provided. I review the literature in four different fields, including audit quality, peer 
pressure, dual audit as well as contagious effect. 
3.1 Audit Quality 
Audit quality has long been studied in the accounting and finance literature. Prior 
research studies in China and other emerging markets have identified factors that 
can significantly influence the quality of audits. 
3 .1.1 Audit firm and Client Firm Characteristics 
Certain characteristics of the CPA firms affect the quality of the audits provided. For 
example, Li, Song and Wong (2008) document a positive relation between audit firm 
size measured by clients' total assets, total sales or total audit fees from clients and 
auditors' propensity to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) in the Chinese market. 
Chan and Wu (2011) study the audit firm size effect via an examination of the 
change in the frequency of MAOs following audit firm mergers. Their study 
documents that auditor quality improves after multi-license mergers, in which at 
least two constituent CPA firms to a merger have licenses to audit listed companies 
because of the increase in the quasi rents at stake after such mergers. The impact of 
CPA firms' legal form qn audit quality is also important. Firth et al. (2012) suggest 
that auditors in a partnership CPA firm tend to be more conservative in issuing audit 
opinions compared with auditors in a limited liability firm. However, no such 
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evidence is found by Lennox eta!. (2012) that CPA firms supply significantly lower 
audit quality when they change from unlimited to limited liability form of firms in 
UK. 
Characteristics of client companies could also significantly affect auditor' 
independence. and the quality of audits. For example, using data from East Asian 
countries, Fan et a!. (2005) find evidence that auditors consider agency conflicts in a 
company when they issue audit opinions. Poor profitability performance is more 
likely to trigger MAOs in companies with separation between control and ownership 
than those without such a separation because the former companies suffer from 
higher agency conflicts. 
3.1.2 Government Influences 
In China, the influence from government does matter in audit quality. Prior studies 
explore how CPA firms' association with government could affect auditor 
independence. For example, an improvement in auditor independence and audit 
quality has been documented after the disaffiliation program in China (Yang et a!., 
2001; Gul et a!., 2009). Chan et a!. (2006) examine whether auditor opinions are 
affected by political and economic influences from local governments. They find 
that local audit firms are more likely to suffer from influence from local 
governments than their non-local counterparts due to their economic reliance on 
local clients. Local auditors are inclined to report favorably on local government-
owned companies and companies tend to switch from a non-local auditor to a local 
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one after receiving MAOs. In addition, Chan, Lin and Wang (2012) docwnent that 
local goverrnnent controlled companies are able to obtain more favorable audit 
opinions from local auditors when they face the need for new equity financing or the 
threat of delisting. Chan, Lin and Zhang (2007) suggest that the decrease in 
goverrnnent ownership and corresponding increase in institutional ownership lead to 
a general increase in the demand for high-quality audits in China's stock market. 
Other factors that are also found to influence audit quality in China include audit-
client importance, audit tenure, auditor switch etc. For example, Chen et al.(2010) 
examines the association between audit quality and client's importance to the 
company. They find that from 1995 to 2000, the individual auditor's propensity to 
issue MAOs is negatively associated with client importance. However, from 2001 to 
2004, the association turns to be positive with improvement in the institutional 
environment. But they do not find significant evidence in the office and firm level. 
Chen and Xia (2006) document an inverse "U" shape association between auditors' 
tenure and the audit quality. They indicate that when the audit tenure.is less than 6 
years, audit tenure has a positive impact on audit quality. The relationship turns to be 
negative when the audit tenure is more than 6 years. Studies on auditor switches 
explore how the various forms of auditor switches affect audit-client relationship 
and audit quality. For example, Firth et al. (2012b) find that partners who rotate back 
after a mandatory audit partner rotation treat former clients more favorably than 
non-rotation-back cases. In a related study, Firth et al. (2012a) docwnent that firms 
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with mandatory audit partner rotations are associated with a significantly higher 
likelihood of MAO than no-rotation firms in less developed regions in China. 
Similar but weaker evidence is also found for voluntary audit firm rotations. Chen, 
Su, and Wu (2009) study the audit quality in a 3-year period after a forced audit firm 
change but with continued partner-client relationship. They indicate that clients with 
greater earnings management activities are more likely to follow their audit partners 
to a new firm, and in the first post-switch year, these followers are less likely to 
report high earnings management items. However, the earnings management 
increases in the next two post-switch years. Another study based on A-share 
companies in China indicates that auditor switch is related to the conservatism ofthe 
predecessor auditors and it could affect the independence of the successive auditors 
(Liu and Liu, 2008). For companies reporting profit in the year of auditor change, 
there is usually a significant increase in the discretionary accruals after the switch. 
However, in companies reporting losses in the year of auditor switch, they take a 
"big bath" to adjust lower earnings of the same year in expectation to report profit in 
the following year. 
3.2 Peer Pressure 
Previous research has studied the impact of peer pressure on audit quality in 
different contexts. Deis and Giroux (1992) find that CPA firms who are members of 
AICPA Peer Review Section supply higher audit quality compared to those non-
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member CPA firms. This indicates that auditors improve the quality of their work 
when it is reviewed by a third party, which will result in a higher probability of audit 
failure detection. Shafer et a!. (1999) document that auditors do feel the pressure 
from peer review. The perceived pressure consequently restrains aggressive 
reporting decisions. More recent literature examines the effectiveness of peer review 
reports in· reflecting audit quality. Hilary and Lennox (2005) find that ·receiving 
clean opinions from peer review helps audit firms in gaining clients, while modified 
and adverse opinions lead to a loss of clients after peer review. Using data set from 
an insurance company, Casterella et a!. (2009) document that AICPA's self-
regulatory peer review effectively reflects the quality of services provided by CPA 
firms. My thesis studies peer pressure in a different context, i.e. the pressure from a 
second auditor of the same firm in a different capital market. 
3.3 DualAudit 
Using three-year data from 1999 to 2001, Li and Wu (2003) find no significant 
difference in audit quality of statutory auditors among different patterns of dual 
audit. Participation of Big 5 auditors does not improve auditor independence and 
consequently audit quality. Lin et a!. (2014) document that companies with dual 
audit are associated with less income-increasing discretionary accruals which 
indicate higher audit quality. The audit quality is even higher when the two auditors, 
domestic and international, are unaffiliated. 
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3.4 Contagious Effect 
There is not much accounting literature which specifically examines the contagious 
effect in an auditing context. However, a spillover effect is widely studied in 
literature. Prior studies examine the spillover effect between CPA firms' non-audit 
services and audit work. Simunic (1984) tests the existence of the spillover effect 
between management advisory services (MAS) and audit service by examining the 
difference in fees paid by clients. He documents that CPA firms are paid more when 
they provide combined audit and advisory services than for pure audit service which 
indicates that MAS have spillover effect on the audit services and improve the audit 
quality as a consequence. The spillover effect from one service to another service is 
also supported by Davis et al. (1993) and Ezzamel, Gwilliam and Holland (1996). 
However, Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan (2003) find no 
significant spillover effect between the non-audit and audit services after controlling 
the endogenous selection problem. Other. studies examine the contagion effect. 
Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2007) find the contagion. effect of share price decline 
due to accounting restatements that have negative impacts on shareholder wealth 
also lead the share price decline of firms in the same industry who do not restate 
their accounting numbers. The contagion effect of the accounting restatements 
induces investors to have concerns about the accounting credibility in the whole 
industry. Francis and Michas (2013) document contagion effect of low-quality 
audits. They find that low-quality audits in an audit office have contagion effect on 
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the quality of audits conducted by the same office. Again, my thesis studies 
contagious effect of a second auditor of the same firm in a different capital market. 
19 
Chapter 4 Hypotheses Development 
4.1 The Chinese Audit Market 
The work of auditors in China is subject to the supervision from· the Chinese 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), the Ministry of Finance and 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Practically, these regulatory 
bodies cooperate with each other in monitoring the work of auditors in China and in 
rendering sanctions where appropriate. According to the 2012 investigation report 
by CICPA, sanctions to individual auditors and audit firms are basically in three 
forms, namely, public condemnation, informed criticism and admonition. 
China has adopted similar ethical requirements for auditors of listed companies as in 
many developed markets including requirements on independence, integrity, 
objectivity, professional competence and confidentiality. However, according to 
Shafer (2008), auditors in China, especially those in local firms, are more likely to 
consider aggressive actions as ethical and express intentions to commit similar 
actions. Aggressive judgments on acceptable actions could have negative impact on 
the quality of audits they provide. For example, they could set higher acceptable 
level of discretionary accruals in their clients' financial statements than their 
counterparts in other markets. 
CSRC requires that all listed companies in China must be audited by Chinese CPAs. 
However, because of the rela\ively weak institutional environment in China 
compared with other industrialized nations, the quality of Chinese audits has long 
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been of the concern for various stakeholders, especially for small and medium CPA 
firms. Most auditing firms in China were initially set up or sponsored by 
government agencies at different levels. The operations of these firms were 
frequently intervened by government agencies which compromised their 
independence and consequently the quality of their audits (Chen, 2004; Lin, 2004). 
Generally speaking, these CPA firms were quite small in size. To solve this problem, 
Chinese government introduced reforms of CPA practices since 1997. These reforms 
include encouragement of mergers of CPA firms, and disaffiliation of CPA firms 
from their government sponsors. These reforms help enhance the independence of 
CPA firms in China and improve their audit quality (Lin eta!., 2003). 
Nevertheless, despite the improvement in the governance and supervision for CPA 
firms, the overall institutional environment in China is still perceived to be weak 
compared with many developed countries. The capital market and the operation of 
companies in China are not subject to sufficient supervision from institutional 
investors. Institutional investors, especially those long-term investors are generally 
well informed and knowledgeable. They normally keep a close eye on the operation 
and corporate governance of firms including the audit of companies they invest in. 
According to Guo (2012), the chairman ofCSRC, by the end of2011, only 15.6% of 
the circulated A shares were held by institutional investors while in developed 
market, institutional investors held around 70% of the market capitalization among 
which half were long-term investors including pension funds and insurance 
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companies. 
4.2 International Well-Renowned CPA firm Groups 
To join in as a member of an international CPA firm group, a CPA firm has to fulfil 
the criteria set by the group for its members. International CPA organizations usually 
have requirements for members on size, experience and service quality. For 
example, Crowe Horwath (2014) states that: 
Elite firms in the Crowe Horwath International organization have been selected 
through a rigorous approval process. This includes providing evidence of 
impeccable service, exhibiting the highest quality standards of operation and 
delivery, illustrating industry leadership through peer review, as well as 
demonstrating superior management competency as evidenced by awards such as 
honors as employer of choice and valued member of their business community. 
In addition to the quality control of member firms in the selection stage, members of 
an international CPA firm organization are also subject to continuous supervision 
after they have gained membership. As all members in a group bear the same brand 
name, international CPA groups are inclined to have rigorous continuous 
examination on the eligibility of their members to avoid possible damage to their 
brand names and reputation. Moreover, international CPA firm organizations have 
internal system for information and knowledge exchange among members and 
provide continuous standardized training. These continuous supervision and training 
ensure a high service quality provided worldwide. Thus, members of international 
CPA firm groups are normally subject to the influence from a strong quality 
assurance environment. 
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4.3 The Hong Kong Audit Market 
AH shares are audited by CPA firms in Hong Kong and the non-Big N international 
auditors of most (70% to 80%) AB share firms are also Hong Kong CPA firms. The 
institutional environment in Hong Kong is thus of great importance to the audit 
quality supplied by the international auditors for AH and AB firms. 
Firms listed in Hong Kong are subject to the co-supervision from five mam 
regulatory authorities, namely, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission 
(HKSFC), the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), the Hong Kong Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA), the Financial Reporting Council(FRC) and 
the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC).4 
HKSFC and HKSE have legal powers to monitor and investigate the audits of 
companies listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In practice, they often refer 
suspected cases to the HKICPA for further investigation (Ke eta!., 2012). HKICPA, 
as the statutory licensing and standard promulgating body for the accounting 
profession in Hong Kong, regulates the conducts of its members and maintains 
investigatory power over audits of non-listed companies. After the establishment of 
FRC, the power of investigating the audits and the accounting records for listed 
companies passes to the FRC. ICAC is responsible for receiving and considering 
allegations of corruptions and investigating the alleged offenses. 
As explained above, overall, the institutional environment in China appears to be 
4 The FRC was established on I December 2006. It became fully operational on 16 July 2007. AH 
share firms are subject to its supervision after that. 
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weaker than that of Hong Kong and many developed markets. Hong Kong and 
international auditors are often subject to a more established system of supervisions, 
from investors to regulatory bodies to provide high quality service. The dual audit in 
China enables the international auditors with high audit quality to examine the 
financial statement of the same client and issue audit opinion accordingly. This 
unique setting could entice domestic auditors to improve their audit quality as they 
have to justify themselves if they issue audit opinions different from the 
international auditors. The international auditors thus effectively create peer pressure 
on the domestic auditors. I therefore argue that the audit engagement of Hong Kong 
or international auditors who often operate in a stronger institutional environment 
have a spillover effect on the quality of A-share audits when these companies are 
subject to dual audit. Thus, my first hypothesis on dual audit effect based on the 
above discussions is as follows: 
Hl: The quality of A-share audit is higher for AB/H share companies whose 
domestic and international auditors are non-Big N CPA firms than for pure A share 
companies which hire non-Big N domestic auditors. 
4.4 Big N versus Non-Big N Auditors 
Big four (or Big N) CPA firms ;are found to supply higher audit quality to their 
clients compared with their non-Big 4 (or non-Big N) competitors. Big 4 (or Big N) 
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CPA firms have more large clients and obtain better capability in hiring talented and 
skilled employees compared with other smaller CPA firms. As Big N audit firms 
have larger pool of clients and hence they have more incentives to protect their 
reputation to avoid loss of clients in a large scale and possible litigation by providing 
higher quality services. DeAngelo (1981) finds that audit firms in larger size tend to 
supply higher audit quality as they have more to lose in audit failures than smaller 
audit firms. Several studies find consistent evidence using various measures of audit 
quality. Palrnrose (1988) suggests that Big eight CPA firms are less likely to have 
litigation activities than non-Big eight auditors. Accounting information that has 
been reviewed by Big N firms is perceived by the market to be more credible 
inferring from market's more active response to earnings in firms with Big N 
auditors (Teoh and Wong, 1993). Using analysts' earnings forecast accuracy and 
forecast dispersion, Behn et al. (2008) find that Big 5 auditors are associated with 
better analysts forecast performance. Lennox and Pittman (2010) find that Big 5 
audits are associated with less likelihood of accounting fraud. 
As Big N auditors maintain high audit quality and the dual audit policy in China 
enables the domestic non-Big N auditor and the Big N international auditor to 
provide audit service to the same client, the Big N international auditor effectively 
plays the supervisory role by providing a reference to the work of non-Big N 
domestic auditors. I therefore argue that the high quality audit of Big N international 
auditors have contagious effect on the audit quality of domestic non-Big N domestic 
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auditors (i.e. the A-share audit). Hence, I formulate the second hypothesis on 
contagious effect that is as follows: 
H2: The quality of A-share audit is higher for an AB!H share company which hires a 
non-Big N domestic auditor and a Big N international auditor than for an ABIH 
share company which only hires non-Big N domestic and international auditors. 
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Chapter 5 Research Design 
5.1 Sample Selection and Data 
My sample includes all non-financial A-share firms listed on the main boards of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2001-2012. The sample period 
begins in 2001, the year when the audit environment in China becomes relatively 
mature and stable. Chen, Sun and Wu (2010) witness great improvements in the 
institutional environment in Chinese market, especially in investor protection since 
2001. Auditors began to face significant litigation risk arising from accounting fraud 
and audit failure starting from 2001 (Chen, 2003). In addition, CPA firms have 
almost completed their mergers prior to 2001. According to Chan and Wu (20 11 ), 
CPA firm mergers peaked in 2000 and there were only a few more mergers in 2001 
and thereafter. This period (2001-2012) also covers the most updated financial report 
information for listed companies. 
I collected the auditor, audit opinion, financial information and corporate 
governance information about sample firms from _the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the WIND database along with other 
sources, including financial statements of the sample firms and websites of 
regulatory bodies. Only firm years with non-Big N domestic auditors are included in 
my sample. Firms in financial sector are excluded from my sample due to their 
special regulatory and reporting environments. AB/H share firm observations 
without dual audit and observations with negative equity are not included either. 
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5.2 Specification of Regression Models 
To test my hypotheses, ·I use two commonly used measures of audit quality in 
accounting literature as proxies for the audit quality in this study, namely, the 
frequency of Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) and the Earnings Response 
Coefficients (ERCs) (Firth et a!., 2007; Chan and Wu, 2011; Chen, Sun and Wu, 
2010; Gul eta!., 2009; Firth eta!., 2012). I include a number of control variables 
which were found in prior studies to have significant impacts on audit quality in 
prior literature. 
5.2.1 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) 
Auditors are hired by companies to express opinions on whether the financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with accounting and legal requirements. 
Management of client companies will try their best to avoid MAOs for their 
financial reports since MAOs will generate suspicion and attract scrutinies from 
regulatory bodies and investors. Due to management's ability to influence the 
appointment of auditors for audit engagements, auditors could be under pressure not 
to issue MAOs. Hence, the audit opinions in the financial reports are often the 
products of negotiations between the management and the auditors .. Management's 
strong preference for unqualified audit opinions and auditors' professional insistence 
to issue proper audit opinions make the auditors' propensity to issue MAOs a 
significant challenge and an appropriate proxy for auditor independence and audit 
quality. 
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Consistent with prior literature, MAOs include unqualified opinion with an 
explanatory paragraph, qualified, disclaimer and adverse audit opinions (Chan and 
Wu, 2011; Firth et a!., 2012). Auditors who maintain higher audit quality have 
propensity to issue more MAOs than their counterparts (DeFend et a!., 2000; Chan 
eta!., 2006; Gul eta!., 2009; Chan and Wu, 2011). I estimate the following probit 
models to test my hypotheses. 
MAO= ao+ a1DUAL+L: aj Control Variables +e 
MAO= f3 o+ fJ1BigN + L: {Jj Control Variables +e 
(1) 
(2) 
where MAO is coded one if a firm in the sample receives an MAO for the firm's A 
share financial statement in the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. DUAL is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a firm has both A shares and B (or H) shares during the 
year and hires a non-Big N domestic and a non-Big N international auditor 
respectively for its A and B (or H) share financial reports, and zero if the firm is a 
pure A share company hiring a non-Big N domestic auditor. BigN is also a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one to indicate that an A share company that also has 
B (or H) shares during the year and hires a non-Big N domestic and a Big N 
international auditor, and zero if an AB/H share firm which hires only non-Big N 
domestic and non-Big N internati()nal auditors. Equation (1) is used to test the dual 
audit effect (Hypothesis 1) while equation (2) is used to test the contagious effect 
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(Hypothesis 2). If there is dual audit effect that suggests dual audit improves audit 
quality, fum-years with dual audit should more likely receive a MAO comparing 
with pure A share firms which are only audited by a domestic auditor during the year. 
after controlling other factors which may influence the issuance of MAOs. Hence, I 
expect the coefficient of DUAL, ~1 • to be positive. Similarly, if contagious effect 
exists, AB/H share firms which hire a non-Big N domestic auditor and a Big N 
international auditor should have higher audit quality than AB/H share firms which 
hire only non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors. Therefore, ~2 is 
expected to be positive as well. 
Control Variables 
Following previous research in financial reporting, various control variables that are 
found to have impacts on a firm's probability ofreceiving a MAO are included (Li, 
Song and Wong, 2008; Chen, Sun and Wu, 2010; Chan and Wu, 2011). 
(1) Financial Statement Variables 
I include the following financial statement variables as control variables, Size 
(natural log of total asset), LOSS (a dummy variable equals to one when the firm 
report a loss, zero otherwise), ARINV (receivables and inventory divided by total 
assets), ROE (return on equity, net income divided by shareholder equity), LEV 
(total liabilities divided by total assets) and TURN (sales divided by total assets). 
Large clients are usually less risky for auditors because of their more stable 
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operations and better internal control system. However, Chen et a!. (20 1 0) find a 
positive association between client importance and auditors' propensity to issue 
MAOs from 2001 to 2004 when the institutional environment in China becomes 
more investor friendly. Thus, no predication on the direction of the association 
between SIZE and MAO is made. In general, a higher level of TURN, ROE 
indicates a lower degree of audit risk. Thus, the coefficients on these variables are 
expected to be negative. As higher level of ARINV is associated with higher audit 
complexity and audit risk, a positive coefficient is expected. Higher Leverage level 
and incurrence of loss are generally associated with higher audit risk. I thus expect a 
positive sign on the coefficients of Lev and Loss. Age, defined as the number of 
years between a firm's year of initial public offering and the fiscal year is also 
included. Conflicting evidences are documented in the literature regarding the 
relationship between firm age and likelihood to experience financial distress. 
Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich (1987) find that young firms are more likely to 
experience financiaLdifficulties. Whereas results in other studies suggest that the 
longer a firm is listed, the more likely the firm becomes financially distressed which 
indicates a higher probability of receiving MAOs (DeFond et a!., 2000; Murray, 
1995). Thus, I do not make prediction on the sign of the coefficient on AGE. 
(2) Stock Market Variables 
To capture those influences on the issuance of MAOs which are not captured by the 
financial statement control variables, I include two stock market variables. The first 
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variable is RET defined as the market-adjusted stock return for the fiscal year. RET 
controls the news or information that has not been reflected by a firm's earning but 
has been recognized by the market and reflected in the change of market return. As 
larger RET means better news and lower audit risk for a firm, RET is expected to be 
negatively associated with MAO. The other variable is STDR which measures 
market risk of returns. To determine the variable STDR, I first estimate the market 
model for each firm using weekly stock return data during the fiscal year. I then 
obtain the standard deviation of residuals from the market model estimated. STDR 
captures risks not incorporated in the financial statement variables. Higher STDR 
suggests higher risk and higher likelihood to receive MAOs as a result. Hence, I 
expect a positive association between STDR and MAO. 
(3) Corporate Governance Variables 
The corporate governance of a company can influence management's behavior and 
consequently the audit risk. I include three variables to control the influence of 
corporate governance environment on audit quality, Indep, Concurrent and EXE. 
Indep is the percentage of independent directors in the boardroom. Concurrent is a 
dummy variable equals to one if the CEO and board chairman are different persons 
and zero otherwise. EXE is the percentage of shareholdings by executives in a firm. 
In firms where management's actions are closely and effectively monitored, 
managers' opportunities to benefit their own wealth at the cost of shareholders like 
some fraudulent schemes should be constrained. Hence, such firms are less likely to 
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receive MAOs. A higher proportion of independent directors in the board, separation 
of CEO and board chairman duties and higher shareholdings by executives are 
found to enhance corporate governance and align the management's interest with 
shareholders' welfare. Therefore, Indep, Concurrent and EXE are expected to be 
negatively associated with the dependent variable MAO. However, prior research 
also found that in firms with low level of independent directors on board and the 
CEO and board chairman positions being served by one person, the management 
have more bargaining power with auditors to constrain auditors' issue of MAOs 
(Carcello and Neal, 2000). Accordingly, the sign of coefficients on Indep and 
Concurrent will be an empirical question. 
(4) Government Influence 
It is widely evidenced in prior studies that the audit quality in Chinese market does 
suffer from the influence from government (Chan et al., 2006; Gul et al., 2009; 
Chan, Lin and Wang, 2012). SOE, a dummy variable equals one if the controlling 
shareholder of a firm is government either local or central, and zero otherwise, is 
included to control the influence from government on· auditors' propensity to issue 
MAOs. Firms that are politically or economically connected with government are 
able to obtain more favorable audit opinions and thus less likely to have MAOs. 
Hence, a negative coefficient is expected on SOE. 
(5) Audit Firm Characteristics 
As prior research finds that audit firm characteristics like size and legal form could 
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influence the quality of services provided by auditors. Thus, I include three variables 
to control impact of the A-share audit firm characteristics on audit quality. First, I 
have Bigl 0 to capture the effect of A-share auditor size on audit quality. Bigl 0 is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to one if the A-share financial report is audited by 
one of the Big 10 CPA firms in the fiscal year. The classification is based on the 
CICPA annual ranking from 2002 onwards. The 2001 classification is based on the 
ranking in 2002 as CICPA did not issue any CPA firms' ranking until 2002. As I 
have observed, most of the rankings do not change drastically over years. A positive 
sign is expected on this variable as larger auditors are inclined to provide higher 
audit quality. The second control variable is FORM, which control the effect of 
different legal forms of CPA firms on their audit quality. This dummy variable takes 
the value of one when the auditors bear unlimited liability in an audit failure and 0 
otherwise. 5 Firth et al. (20 12) find that auditors with unlimited liability are more 
conservative. Thus, a positive sign is expected on FORM. I also include SWITCH, a 
dummy which equals 1 if the audit firm of a company in current fiscal year is 
different from last year and 0 otherwise. I use this variable to control the impact of 
auditor switch on audit quality. 
(6) Industry and Year Dummy 
I use these variables to control the industry and year effects. Industry is a dummy 
5 The classification is based on the title of each CPA firm in A-share audit reports and cross-checked 
with website of the CPA firm and disclosure by related regulatory bodies. Unlimited CPA firms in 
China are in two forms, general partnership and special general pa1tnership. 
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variable coded I when a firm is from a manufacturing industry, and zero 
otherwise. 6 Manufacturing companies and non-manufacturing companies are 
different in terms of competitive environment, assets structure, nature of business, 
etc. 7 Eleven year dummy variables are included in the estimation model. 
5.2.2 Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs) 
Earnings response coefficient is used to examine market's reaction to the earnings of 
a firm in the financial statements. It measures the informativeness ot the earnings. 
Strictly speaking, ERC is a measure .of earnings quality. In accounting literature, 
earnings quality is widely used as proxy for audit quality (Myers eta!., 2003; Chung 
and Kallapur, 2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005). According to agency theory, managers 
in a company have incentives to serve their own benefits even at the cost of 
shareholders. They may achieve it through manipulating the earnings. When audit 
quality is high, management's earnings management faces higher risk of being 
detected. Thus, high audit quality could constrain earnings management of a firm. 
As a result, it is reasonable to draw reference about audit quality from earnings 
quality that higher earnings quality should be associated with higher audit quality. 
Earnings quality measurements in literature are generally either accounting based 
like abnormal accruals or market based like ERC. I use the market-based 
6 The classification of manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry is based on CSRC industry 
classification. Observations with CSRC industry code starting with letter C are in manufacturing 
industry. 
7 Due to the small sample size in the contagious effect tests, especially in the tests using the PSM 
method, it is not feasible to adopt industry classifications which were used in many previous studies, 
as this will result in too many variables in terms of the matched subsample size in contagious effect 
tests using PSM. 
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measurement to provide additional evidence about the impact of dual audit and 
contagious effects on audit quality as MAO is basically an accounting-based 
measure. When a firm has high audit quality, its earnings information should be 
more closely related to the firm's capital market performance and this in turn should 
better facilitate investors' decision making. Investors tend to be more sensitive and 
respond more actively to the earnings announcements of firms with high audit 
quality. I use the following models to test my hypotheses. Model (3) tests the impact 
of dual audit on ERC, a proxy for audit quality, while Model ( 4) tests the contagious 
effect. 
CAR=yo+Y1jj,E +y2DUAL+y1jj,E* DUAL+'i.yiControl Variables+t: 
CAR=80+81jj,E +82BigN+81jj,E* BigN+ 'i. oi Control Variables+t: 
(3) 
(4) 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. To get CAR, I first estimate market 
model parameters a and ~ for each individual firm using the weekly stock return 
without cash dividend reinvested in year t-1. Observations are dropped if less than 
15 weekly return data is available in year t-1. Then the weekly return is obtained by 
subtracting a and ~Rmt from the weekly return of each firm. I cumulate the weekly 
abnormal return to get CAR (as shown in equation (5)). The weekly data is used as 
there are only 12 observations tq estimate the market model for each company if 
monthly figures are used. The estimation may have more biases. Estimation with 
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daily figures may not clearly show the overall trend of the data. Thus, weekly 
figures are used in the CAR calculation as the best compromise. 
(5) 
where i is firm i and t is the week from month -8 to month 4 where month 0 is the 
fiscal year-end. I begin with the fifth month after the fiscal year-end of t-1 and 
ending four months after the fiscal year-end to enable investors to incorporate the 
annual earnings information. According to the Rules of Contents and Format of 
Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Securities No. 2 issued by CSRC, 
companies offering securities should publish annual reports in website specified by 
CSRC and summaries of financial reports in at least one of the specified newspaper 
within four months after the accounting year. As all listed companies in China have 
fiscal year end on December 31, this effectively means that all annual reports and 
summaries of financial reports should be published before the end of April. I use the 
data from May to April to calculate CAR to incorporate market's reaction (to the 
earnings information reported in the annual report) into the measurement. Using 
data from January to December may induce bias as investors do not have earnings 
information until the release of annual report. 
!:J.E is the change in the annual earnings deflated by the firm's market value of 
equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. DUAL and BigN are the same as defined 
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in the MAO model as dummy variables to indicate whether there is dual audit and 
contagious effects respectively. The coefficients of t.E, Y1 and 15}, respectively assess 
the earning response coefficient for pure A firms (DUAL equals 0) and AB/H share 
firms with non-Big N international auditors (BigN equals 0). y 1 and 151 are expected 
to be positive according to prior research (Firth, Fung and Rui, 2007; Hanlon, 
Maydew and Shevline, 2008). y3 and OJ respectively represent the incremental effect 
of dual audit effect and contagious effect (i.e. having Big N international auditors) 
on investors' responsiveness to firms' earnings. I hypothesize that the A-share audit 
quality improves through dual audit and the contagious effect on the work of non-
Big N domestic auditors from Big N international auditors. Thus, I expect the 
coefficients of the interaction terms t.E* DUAL and t.E* BigN to be positive and 
significant. 
Same as the MAO models, a number of variables that are found to have impacts on 
the association between change in earnings and stock returns are_included_as_control 
variables to control their influences on the association between the test variables and 
dependent variable. First, I have BV, the book value of equity per share at the end of 
fiscal year. Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) find that stock price is positively 
related to earnings and book value. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected on BV. 
Growth' is defined as the market Vfllue to book value ratio of equity at the fiscal year 
end. It captures the growth opportunities for a firm. It is easier for fast growing firms 
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to engage in earnings manipulation than it is for mature firms since it is difficult to 
monitor the business activities of fast growing firms (Collins and Kothari, 1989; 
Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). Thus, a negative association is expected between 
Growth and the dependent variable. Other control variables including SIZE, LEV, 
Indep, Concurrent, EXE are as defined earlier. Current is the current assets divided 
by current liabilities. The different levels of financial liquidity imply different level 
of risk for investors. Therefore, I expect Current to be positively and LEV to be 
negatively associated with ERC (Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). The impact of fum 
size on market returns is mixed in literature (Warfield eta!., 1995; Firth eta!., 2007). 
So, no directional prediction is made on the coefficient of SIZE. Higher percentage 
of independent directors, separation of board chairman and CEO duties and higher 
level of executive shareholdings are found to be associated with better corporate 
governance which constrains management's earnings management. Consequently, 
investors are inclined to react more actively to the earnings changes of these firms 
perceived to be with better corporate governance. Hence, positive coefficients are 
expected on these three variables. STDR is also included as well to capture the risks 
not incorporated in the financial statement variables. To be consistent with the 
measurement of CAR, the STDR used in tests based on ERC will be the standard 
deviation of residuals from the market model estimated using weekly stock return 
from month -8 to month 4, where month 0 is the fiscal year end. SOE is also 
included as in MAO model to capture the possible influence from government. The 
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three audit firm characteristics variables are also included in ERC model to control 
their influence on the earnings informativeness. 
5.3 Self-Selection Bias 
Whether to have both A shares and B (or H) shares or to hire a Big N auditor are 
subject to firms' own choices. To address the potential self-selection bias, I use the 
two-stage Heckman (1979) approach as well as Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
method (Chaney et al., 2004; Lawrence et al., 2011; Kim, Chung and Firth, 2003; 
Lennox et al., 2012; Chan and Wu, 2011) to estimate the probability of a firm 
choosing to have both A shares and B (or H) shares and the probability of hiring a 
Big N CPA firm as the international auditor. 
DUAL= J.l.o+ J11 Sales __growth+ J.1.2SIZE+ J.1.3Lev + J.i.4TURN + J.i.sROE+ /16Loss 
+ 111ARINV+ /lsCASH+ /19Indep+ 11wConcurrent+ 11uEXE 
+ 1112 Industry+ lli Year+ e 
BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ A.2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ ~CURR+ A.sLosst-1 + A.6ROA 
+ A7 Indep+ A.sConcurrent + AgEXE+ A.wRightst+l 
+ A.uMAOt-1 + A.12 Industry+ A.; Year+ e 
(6) 
(7) 
Equation (6) is the selection model to estimate the firm's probability to choose to 
have both A shares and B (or H) shares listed while equation (7) estimates the 
probability of hiring a Big N international auditor. Sales_growth is defined as the 
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percentage change in sales between the current fiscal year and the year before. 
CURR and CASH respectively represent the percentage of current asset and cash or 
cash equivalents in total assets. Losst-1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm reports a loss in year t-1 where t is the fiscal year. MA0,_1 represents whether 
the firm receives modified audit opinion in year t -I. Rights,+! equals to one if a firm 
have a rights issue in the year after the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Firms planning to 
have rights issue next year tend to be more likely to hire Big N auditors to enhance 
the credibility of the financial information. Other variables were as defined earlier. 
In the Heckman two-stage procedure, I estimate Equation ( 6) or Equation (7) first. 
Then I compute the inverse Mills ratio, Lambda, based on the results of the first 
stage estimation. In the second stage, I include the inverse Mills ratio, Lambda, as a 
control variable to correct for possible self-selection bias. 
In propensity score matching method, the two equations are used to select the 
observations in treatment and control groups that will be further used in the main 
test. I first predict the propensity for a firm to choose to have A shares and B (or H) 
shares listed or to choose a Big N international auditor based on the model defined. 
Then I match each observation in the treatment group with an observation in the 
control group with very close propensity. I constrain the propensity difference to be 
less than 0.1 percent. Consequently, I will obtain a subsample of firms composing of 
the pairwise observations from 'the treatment and the control groups with similar 
firm characteristics. 
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Chapter 6 Empirical Results 
The overall organization of this chapter is given in Figure I. I test two effects, dual 
audit effect and contagious effect and use two measures of audit quality, MAO and 
ERC. Two methods are employed to control for self-selection, Heckman two-stage 
method and PSM method. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable MAO 
and the univariate test for the sample. I have 13,540 pure A share firm-year 
observations, 287 observations for AB/H share firms which hire non-Big N domestic 
and international auditors and 172 AB/H share firms that hire non-Big N domestic 
auditors and Big N international auditors. As showed in the table, the mean of MAO 
is 0.061 and 0.157 for pure A share firms and AB/H share firms with only non-Big N 
auditors respectively while it is 0.099 for AB/H share firms with Big N international 
auditors. The portion of observations that have MAO is 6.1 %, 15.7% and 9.9% for 
pure A share firm, AB/H share firm with non-Big N international auditor and AB/H 
share firm with Big N international auditor, respectively. These numbers are similar 
when firm-year observations with Big N domestic auditors and firms in financial 
industry are included, which would be 7.7% versus 15.8% for pure A share and 
AB/H share firms respectively, while this figure is 7.8% for all main-board listed A 
share firms in the twelve-year period. 
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(Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 1 panel B displays the descriptive statistics for all the independent variables. 
AB/H share firms with non-Big N international auditor rank the highest in terms of 
firm size, leverage and asset turnover among three groups. 21% of AB/H sample 
firm-year observations reported loss while this figure is only 11.43% for pure A 
share firms. From the table, some other characteristics could also be observed. AB/H 
share firms (non-Big N) set aside a higher portion for accounts receivables and 
inventories in their asset structure than pure A share firms. In terms of corporate 
governance aspects, I found that pure A share firms have the highest percentage of 
independent directors in their boardrooms and executives and top managers in pure 
A share firms hold more company shares measured as their shareholdings over the 
total shares outstanding. The mean market-adjusted stock return is positive for pure 
A share firms and AB/H share firms with Big N international auditors but negative 
for AB/H share firms which hire non-Big N international auditors. Differences of 
independent variables mentioned are all significant at 1% level. Mean differences in 
the remaining three independent variables including ROE, Concurrent and STDR 
are not significant. It is interesting that AB/H share firms with non-Big N 
international auditors are more likely to hire unlimited liability and larger CPA firms 
for their A-share audit than AB/H share firms with Big N international auditors. It 
may indicate that AB/H share fir~s recognize the high audit quality of international 
Big N auditors and have lower demand for high quality A-share audit. 
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Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent variable and all the 
independent variables. The dependent variable MAO is significantly correlated with 
most of the independent variables except the Concurrent variable, which indicates 
whether the firm CEO and board chairman are the same person and the STDR 
variable which captures the risk not reflected in financial statements. It is clear in the 
correlation matrix the dependent variable MAO is as expected to be positively and 
significantly correlated with the experimental variable DUAL. MAO is also 
negatively and significantly related to financial statement variables SIZE, TURN, 
ROE and corporate governance variables Indep and EXE as well as market variable 
RET. The negative correlations suggest that larger firms with better performance and 
liquidity are less likely to receive non-clean audit opinion from their auditors. The 
corporate governance variables' negative sign suggests that the higher the level of 
independent directors in the boardroom and the executives' shareholdings, the less 
likely will the firm receive modified opinion. Furthermore, the negative correlation 
for RET means that auditors are less likely to modify their opinion when there are 
more good news recognized by investors but not yet incorporated in earnings. The 
remaining variables including LEV, LOSS, ARINV SWITCH are positively and 
significantly associated with auditors' propensity to issue modified opinion. The 
positive correlations are consistent with prior studies that higher leverage and 
occurrence of loss bring higher degree of audit risk and induce higher probability for 
audit opinion to be modified. High percentage of accounts receivable and inventory 
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in the asset structure increases audit complexity and higher possibility of non-clean 
audit opinion consequently. Firms with auditor switch are more likely to receive 
MAO. As there are some significant correlations between independent variables 
(e.g. correlation between RET and STDR), I use variance inflation factor(VIF) to 
test if there may be a multicollinearity problem. The result shows that the largest 
VIF is 2.87 which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem in my regression 
analysis.8 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
6.2 Multivariate Analysis---MAOs 
6.2.1 Dual Audit effect---Heckman Two-Stage Model 
Table 3 presents the multivariate regression result for the dual audit effect testing 
using the Heckman two-stage selection model. Table 3 panel A reports the result of 
the stage-one pro bit estimation of firms choosing to have both A shares and B (or H) 
shares listed. The year dummies are included in the estimation but the results are not 
reported. I find the coefficients of SIZE, TURN, LEV, LOSS and Indep are positive 
and significant. Therefore, firms with both A and B (or H) shares tend to be larger, 
with higher turnover and leverage, and report loss more frequently than their pure A 
counterparts. These firms also leave more seats for independent directors in their 
boardroom. The result also shows that EXE is negatively associated with firms 
8 According to common rule of thumb, further investigation is necessary when a VIF is larger than 4 
and a VIF exceeding I 0 suggests serious multicollinearity problem (Kutner eta!., 2004). 
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having both A shares and B (or H) shares listed. It means that management in AB/H 
firms hold less percentage of company shares compared with their peers in the pure 
A share firms. The coefficients of the remaining five variables are insignificant. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 3 panel B shows the second-stage estimation results. The result shows that the 
coefficient on the experimental variable, DUAL, is positive and significant at 5% 
level. It suggests that A share auditors have higher propensity to zssue MAOs to 
firms with dual audit compared with their pure A share clients who are only audited 
by the domestic auditors. Thus, I could draw reference from the result that firms 
with dual audit are associated with higher audit quality. Hypothesis 1 is supported 
that the A share audit quality is higher for AB/H firms being audited by both 
domestic and international auditors than pure A share firms. 
The coefficients of control variables are also reported in Table 3 Panel B. In 
particular, the coefficients on SIZE, LEV and LOSS are as expected and significant. 
It is consistent with the expectations that smaller firms and firms with higher 
leverage level and incurring a loss in the fiscal year are with higher level of audit 
risk and more likely to receive MAOs as a result. TURN, RET are as expected to be 
negatively associated with MAO. It's consistent with prior studies that firms with 
higher turnover ratio, more good news not recognized in earnings are characterized 
as firms with lower audit risk. The variable Age is positively and significantly 
correlated with MAO. It supports that younger listed firms in China are less likely to 
46 
receive MAOs (DeFond et al. 2000; Chan and Wu, 2011). The positive and 
significant coefficient on STDR is consistent with prior research findings that STDR 
represents additional risks to a firm apart from risks captured by financial statement 
variables. The results for the three corporate governance variables Concurrent, Indep 
and EXE are insignificant. Industry and year dummies are controlled in this model 
but not reported with detail. SOE which captures a firm's association with 
government, is negatively associated with MAO. It indicates that the association 
with government influence auditor independence and auditors are less likely to issue 
MAO to government-connected firms. Auditor switch have significant effect on 
probability of receiving MAO. New auditors are more likely to issue MAOs. 
6.2.2 Dual Audit Effect--- Propensity Score Matching 
In this section, I first estimate the selection model as specified in equation ( 6) to 
predict the propensity for an A share firm choosing to have both A shares and B (or 
H) shares listed. Then I use the result from the estimation to match each AB/H share 
firm with a pure A share firm. To ensure the AB/H group is closely matched with the 
pure A share group, I constrain the differences in the predicted probabilities to be 
less than 0.1 %. I have 564 pairwise AB/H and pure A share firm-year observations 
matched. That means 282 AB/H and 282 pure A share firm-year observations will be 
included in the next-step estimation. To ensure these two groups are really closely 
matched with each other, I use univariate t test to see whether these two groups have 
significant differences in the mean values of the independent variables in equation 
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( 6). Table 4 panel A shows the result of the t test. It is clear that the mean value 
differences of all independent variables in equation ( 6) are insignificant. It suggests 
that I have matched these two groups successfully and been able to correct the 
possible selectivity problem. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Table 4 panel B shows the result of the estimation of equation (1) using the 282 pairs 
of matched observations. The result is similar to that of the Heckman two-stage 
selection model. My main interest is the coefficient on DUAL which is as expected 
to be positive and significant at 1% level, supporting hypothesis 1. Dual audit is 
again shown to improve the A-share audit quality in China market. The results for 
most of the control variables are similar using the two different methods to control 
the potential selection problem. However, the coefficient on ARINV, turns out to be 
significant in this propensity score matching estimation. The corporate governance 
variables, Indep and EXE, still have no significant impact on auditors' propensity to 
issue MAOs. However, it is interesting to find that the Concurrent variable is 
positively associated with the probability of receiving MAOs. It's consistent with 
the prior finding that one person holds both the CEO and board chairman position in 
a firm could have higher bargaining power with auditors to reduce non-clean audit 
opinions (Carcello and Neal, 2000). 
To summarize, the results of both the Heckman two-stage selection model and 
propensity score matching estimation support hypothesis one that the audit quality 
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of A-share financial statements measured as auditors' propensity to issue MAOs, is 
higher for AB/H firms with dual audit than pure A share firms. 
6.2.3 Contagious Effect--- Heckman Two- stage Model 
Table 5 shows the results of contagious effect on probability of receiving MAOs. 
Panel A shows the results of the first-stage pro bit regression. SIZE and LEV are 
significantly associated with the choice to hire Big N international auditors. It 
suggests that firms of larger size and with lower leverage level are more likely to 
hire Big N international auditors. Firms have Big N international auditors also have 
lower asset turnover and more current assets in the asset structure. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
Table 5 Panel B reports the second-stage regression results. 9 The coefficient on 
BigN is negative but insignificant. It indicates no sufficient evidence that hiring a 
Big N international auditor significantly affects the probability of receiving MAOs. 
6.2.4 Contagious Effect--- Propensity Score Matching 
In this section, I first use model specified in Equation (7) to obtain the propensity 
score for each firm-year observation and match the treatment group in which AB/H 
share firms hiring non-Big N domestic auditors and Big N international auditors are 
included and control group which consists of AB/H firms hiring non-Big N domestic 
and non-Big N international auditors with no replacement. The matched pairs will 
be further used in the main tests of the contagious effect. Table 6 Panel A shows the 
9 One Control variable, the percentage of independent directors on the board, is excluded from the 
regression due to its high correlation with a year dummy. 
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univariate t test of the independent variables in Equation (7). There is no significant 
difference .of the mean values of the variables between the two groups in the 
matched sample. It indicates that firms in these two groups are similar in 
characteristics specified in Equation (7) which could influence a firm's decision 
whether to have a Big N or a non-Big N international auditor. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Table 6 Panel B shows the results of contagious effect on auditors' propensity to 
issue MAOs using the propensity score-matched sample. The coefficient on BigN is 
still insignificant. It suggests that the type of the international auditor does not 
significantly affect domestic auditors' propensity to issue MAOs. 
To summarize, no significant evidence is found that hiring a Big N international 
auditor significantly affects the probability that the audit opinions of A-share 
financial reports are modified. 
6.3 Multivariate Analysis--- Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC) 
6.3.1 Dual Audit Effect---Heckman Two-stage Model 
Table 7 Panel A reports the results of the first-stage estimation. The results are 
similar to those in Table 3 Panel A: company size, turnover, leverage level as well as 
reporting of loss are positively associated with the probability of having both A and 
B (or H) shares listed. The coefficients on ROE, CASH and Concurrent turn out to 
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be significant. 
Table 7 Panel B reports the results of the Heckman two-stage regressions for the 
dual audit effect with audit quality being measured by earnings response coefficient. 
y3, the coefficient on the interaction term !J.E* DAUL which is my main interest is 
positive and marginally significant at 10% level. This is consistent with my 
expectation in the hypothesis that dual audit improves A-share audit quality. In this 
case, it is reflected in investors' more active response to earning changes. The 
positive coefficient suggests that dual audit has an incremental effect on earnings 
informativeness. y 1 is, as predicted, positive and significant. Consistent with prior 
studies, I find that the market reacts more actively to earning changes in smaller 
firms and with higher percentage of shares held by management and higher book 
value of equity. STDR which indicates additional risk to investors is negatively 
associated with the dependent variable CAR. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
6.3.2 Dual Audit Effect--- Propensity Score Matching 
The t test of each firm characteristics in the selection equation is reported in Table 8 
Panel A. According to the univariate t test, no significant difference in the mean 
value of the variables is observed except Concurrent, indicating that the two groups 
of firms (pure A share firms and AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and 
non-Big N international auditors) in the matched subsample have similar 
characteristics. I have 266 propensity-matched pairs in the subsample. Table 8 Panel 
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B shows the results of the ERC regression for dual audit effect using the matched 
sample. The coefficient on !J.E is still positive but not significant. The incremental 
effect of dual audit in this case is positive and significant at 1% level. It indicates 
that dual audit significantly improves the earnings response coefficient. Regarding 
the control variable, STDR is negatively and significantly associated with CAR. It's 
consistent with prior studies that investors react less actively to earnings changes in 
firms with higher risk. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
To summarize, I have evidence that investors are more responsive to earning 
changes in firms with dual audit compared to pure A share firms which are only 
audited by domestic auditors when I use both the Heckman two-stage procedure and 
propensity score matching method to control the potential self-selection bias. 
6.3.3 Contagious Effect---Heckman Two-Stage Model 
The first-stage selection results are shown in Table 9 Panel A, which are similar to 
those in Table 5 Panel A. SIZE, LEV are found to have significant impact on AB/H 
share firms' choice to hire Big N international auditors. Table 9 Panel B shows the 
results of the second stage regression. 03, which represents the incremental effect of 
having Big N international auditors on the earning response coefficient, is positive 
with 10% significance. It provides evidence that the market perceives the earnings 
of firms hiring Big N internatio:nal auditors more credible. !J.E is positively and 
significantly associated with the dependent variable as found in prior studies. 
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(Insert Table 9 here) 
6.3.4 Contagious Effect---Propensity Score Matching 
Table 10 Panel A reports the t test results of each firm characteristics, no significant 
difference between the two groups of sample firms hiring Big N versus non-Big N 
international auditors is observed. It indicates that I have successfully balanced the 
covariates between the treated subsamples, which consist of AB/H share firms 
which hire Big N international auditors and the matched control subsample. I obtain 
72 pair firm-year observations. Table 10 Panel B shows the results of ERC 
regression with the matched subsample. Coefficient on the interaction term !1E* 
BigN is positive and significant at 5% level. Hypothesis 2 is supported that Big N 
international auditors have spillover effect on the work of domestic auditors and 
improves the A share audit quality as a consequence. 15 1, coefficient of 11 E is 
insignificant in this setting. 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
In sum, Big N international auditors are shown to have contagious effect on the 
work of domestic auditors and improvement in A-share audit quality provides one 
such evidence. I draw implication about the audit quality from market's 
responsiveness to firm's earnings information. Both the Heckman two-stage and 
propensity score-matching model demonstrate an incremental effect of Big N 
international auditors on earnings ;response coefficient. 
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Table 11 summarizes the results of the main tests. Hypothesis 1. which predicts that 
dual audit improves A-share audit quality is supported when audit quality measured 
by auditors' propensity to issue MAOs and earnings response coefficient (regression 
#1,2,5 and 6 in Table 11). Mixed evidences are generated for hypothesis 2. Big N 
international auditors are found to have contagious effect on the work of domestic 
auditors when earnings response coefficient is used to measure the quality of 
domestic auditors' work (regression #7 and 8). However, no significant impact of 
Big N international auditors on the A-share audit quality can be documented when 
audit quality is measured by probability of receiving MAOs (regression# 3 and 4). 
It implies that Big N international auditors play an important role in constraining 
earnings management and improving the earnings quality and investors perceive the 
earnings information of firms with Big N international auditors to be more credible 
and response more actively to the earning changes in such firms as a consequence. 
However, the contagious effect from Big N international auditor does not seem to 
affect domestic auditors' behavior in modifying their audit opinions probably due to 
other political or economic factors that affect the audit opinions of domestic 
auditors. 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
6.4 Sensitivity Tests 
I perform several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of the findings. The details 
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of these tests are discussed in the followed sections. 
6.4.1 Alternative Definition of MAO 
Dependent variable MAO is a dummy variable classified as either clean or modified 
audit opinion. This classification may raise concern that the results may be 
inaccurate as different types of audit opinions reflect different level of seriousness of 
problems in the financial statement. The second sensitivity test is used to address 
such concern. 10 I use a new dependent variable MAO_N which is an ordered-level 
variable, which is coded from 0 to 4 for standard unqualified, unqualified with 
explanatory notes, qualified, disclaimed and adverse opinions, respectively. Then I 
use the ordered-probit regression to rerun prior regressions. The results are 
qualitatively similar as in the main tests as shown in Table 12 Panel B. In the dual 
audit testing, DUAL is positive and significant at 10% level using Heckman two-
stage and significant at 1% level with propensity score-matching method when 
MAO is used to measure audit quality. For the contagious effect, hiring a Big N 
international auditor is not found to significantly affect the A-share audit quality. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
6.4.2 Alternative Definition of CAR 
In ERC test above, CAR is measured using the estimated market model parameters 
a and ~- In the sensitivity test, I assume the market model beta is unity for sample 
10 I also perform another sensitivity test by reclassifying the "unqualified opinion with emphasis of 
matter paragraph" audit opinion as cleari to rerun the MAO regressions. Neither dual audit nor hiring 
a Big N international auditor has significant impact on the dependent variable MAO due to the highly 
unbalanced sample. More than 65% of the modified audit opinions in the main tests are "unqualified 
opinion with emphasis of matter paragraph" audit opinion. 
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firms and calculate the weekly abnormal return by subtracting the market return 
from each firm's weekly stock return without cash dividend reinvested (see equation 
(8) below) (Teoh and Wong, 1993). Then I cumulate the weekly abnormal return 
beginning with the fifth month to get the new cumulative abnormal return, CAR2, 
after the fiscal year-end of t-1 and ending four months after the fiscal year-end to 
enable investors to incorporate the annual earnings information. Here, I use the 
simpler measure of CAR by adopting the unity beta assumption to avoid introducing 
unnecessary noise which could rise if stock beta estimated from market model is 
used in the equation. Prior studies suggest that the market model with the beta 
estimated from the market model may not be applicable in Chinese market in 
explaining the risk and return relationship, due to relatively low market efficiency 
and less educated investors (Jin and Liu, 2001; Li, 2009). 
CAR2=l; log(! +Rit-Rmt) (8) 
Table 12 Panel B reports the results of dual audit effect and contagious effect on 
ERC based on CAR2 instead of CAR in the main tests. As can be observed from the 
Table (Panel B), both dual audit and hiring a Big N international auditor have 
positive and significant effect on earnings responsiveness when Heckman two-stage 
model is used to address the potential self-selection problem. Contagious effect is 
also supported by propensity score matching method. However, no significant 
evidence about dual audit effect is provided if propensity score matching method is 
used. My results are robust to alternative measurement of CAR. 
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6.4.3 Mandatory Dual Audit Only 
My samples in the main tests contain both mandatory and voluntary dual audit in the 
sample period from 2001 to 2012. To respond to the concern that there may be some 
unobservable factors that influence a firm's decision to continue to have dual audit 
voluntarily, which may be biased in favour of the conclusion drawn from the main 
tests. To address such concern, I exclude the firm-year observations with voluntary 
dual audit in the sample and rerun the regressions. This means that AB share firm-
year observations which still have dual audit in the fiscal year end 2007 and 
afterwards and AH share firm-year observations that have dual audit from 2010 to 
2012 will be excluded in this sensitivity test. The results are as shown in Table 12 
Panel C. The results are similar to the main test results. However, the dual audit 
effect and contagious effect on ERC based on propensity score matching turn out to 
be insignificant. The test of contagious effect based on MAO using PSM method is 
not feasible due to sample size limitation. The results suggest that the conclusion 
drawn earlier in the-main tests regarding the dual audit effect and contagious effect 
is robust when voluntary dual audits are excluded from the sample. 
6.4.4 Include AB Share Dual Audit Only 
Despite that both AB share firms and AH share firm are subject to dual audit in 
China, there may be concern that international auditors hired by these two kinds of 
firms are with different characteri.stics. For example, although many AB share firms 
hire CPA firms in Hong Kong as their international auditors, CPA firms' audit work 
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for AH share firms are subject to the scrutiny of Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 
HKSFC while AB share audits are not. To respond to the concern the potential 
different characteristics of AB share firms and AH share firms' international auditors 
may make the conclusion drawn about the dual audit and contagious effect 
inaccurate, I use subsamples with AH share firm-year observations excluded. Table 
12 Panel D shows the results. Dual audit effect on probability of receiving MAOs is 
still significant. No significant evidence of contagious effect on audit opinion is 
found. Both dual audit effect and contagious effect on earnings responsiveness are 
supported when Heckman two-stage selection model is used. The coefficient on the 
interaction terms (liE* DUAL and liE* BigN ) tum out to be insignificant using 
propensity score matching method. 
6.4.5 Pre- and Post-abolishment Comparison 
Another approach to assess the dual audit effect is to compare pre- and post-
abolishment audit quality to test whether the abolishment of dual audit requirement 
compromises the audit quality of AB/H share firmsY I compare the-audit quality of 
A-share financial statements of AB share firms in the pre-abolishment period (with 
dual audit) with the audit quality post-abolishment period (without dual audit). In 
this comparison, voluntary dual audits after the abolishment are not included. Table 
12 Panel E shows the test results. POST is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
11 The dual audit requirement for AH share firms is abolished in 2010. However, most AH share firms 
in my sample do have dual audit in the post-abolishment period (from 2010 to2012) on a voluntary 
basis. As a result, AH share firm observations are excluded from the comparison. 
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1 if the fiscal year is in the post-abolishment period and 0 if the fiscal year is in the 
pre-abolishment period. As shown in the table, the coefficient of POST is negative 
and significant, suggesting that AB share firms are less likely to receive MAOs in 
the post-abolishment period compared with the pre-abolishment period. However, 
no significant difference in earnings responsiveness is found between those two 
periods. 
Lin eta!. (2014) also examine the impact of dual audit on A-share audit quality. My 
thesis is different from their study in terms of measures of audit quality, self-
selection methods used, effects tested as well as my focus on non-Big N audit 
quality and sample period used. They use discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit 
quality and they only use Heckman two-stage model to address the potential self-
selection problem. Two measures of audit quality are adopted in this thesis, MAO 
and ERC, representing both Accounting-Auditing based and market-based measures. 
As discretionary accruals tend to have high measurementerror and there is a lack of 
consensus on how it should be measured, I believe I use better measures of audit 
quality. In addition, I use both Heckman two-stage and PSM methods to solve the 
self-selection problem. As these two methods have their own merits in addressing 
self-selection bias, my thesis provides more comprehensive evidence in assessing 
the real effect of dual, audits on audit quality. My thesis separates the dual audit 
effect and contagious effect while these two effects were confounded with by Lin et 
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al.(2014). I focus on the audit quality of non-Big N auditors which is of greater 
concern and academic interest. My thesis utilizes the most updated data including 
both mandatory and voluntary dual audits. My sample period is from 2001 to 2012 
as opposed to 2001 to 2009 in Lin et al.(2014). 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis· examines the dual audit effect and the contagious effect on the audit 
quality of A-share financial statements. The unique setting in the Chinese market 
that pure A share firms only need to be audited by domestic auditors while AB/H 
share firms are subject to dual audit by both domestic and international auditors 
makes it possible to test the impact of dual audit and contagious effect of Big N 
international auditors on audit quality by comparing the quality of services provided 
by domestic auditors. The test results reveal consistent superior audit quality in 
AB/H share firms that are subject to dual audit and hire non-Big N domestic and 
non-Big N international auditors, as compared with those pure A share firms which 
are only audited once by their domestic auditors. However, mixed evidences are 
documented regarding the contagious effect of Big N international auditors on the 
audit quality of A -share financial reports when different measures of audit quality 
are used. Hiring a Big N CPA firm as an international auditor is found to improve 
investors' responsiveness but no significant influence on the audit opinion issued by 
auditors. 
This study contributes to the literature of audit quality, particularly the literature on 
audit quality of non-Big N auditors in emerging markets. Audit quality of non-Big N 
auditors in emerging markets with relative weak institutional environment is of great 
concern and attracts increasing research interests. My findings provide new evidence 
on the factors that affect the audit quality of non-Big N auditors in China. 
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This study has important implications for regulatory bodies in China by providing 
empirical evidence on the dual audit effect and contagious effect in the dual audit 
setting and consequently on ways to improve audit quality in Chinese market. 
Regulatory bodies, especially the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(CICPA) and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), emphasize the 
importance of auditors' service quality and have made persistent efforts to explore 
ways to improve audit quality. As this study shows that being dual audited and 
hiring Big N international auditors are associated with higher audit quality, 
regulatory bodies could consider such effects in making new regulations and rules. 
My thesis has important policy implications for the Ministry of Finance in China 
which issued the Provisional Regulations on Cross-border Audit Services of CPA 
Firms (consultative draft) in May 2014. 12 According to the draft, non-PRC CPA 
firms are not allowed to supply audit services to Chinese enterprises listed overseas. 
It also specifically precludes non-PRC CPA firms' audit services to enterprises 
registered overseas but with operating entities in China. My research results indicate 
that dual audit does improve the audit quality supplied by domestic auditors, as 
established international auditors provide effective pressure on the domestic auditors 
to maintain higher audit quality. 13 Thus, the restriction of non-PRC CPA firms' audit 
services to Chinese companies may make it more difficult to improve audit quality 
12 See footnote I. 
13 Particularly, Hong Kong auditors play very important roles in providing peer pressure to domestic 
auditors. Hong Kong auditors are familiar with the Chinese business environment (70% to 80% of 
international auditors in dual audit effect tests are Hong Kong CPA firms) and are subject to a more 
established and stronger institutional environment. 
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in China. This is an important implication of my research. 
There are also implications for regulatory bodies in other emerging markets. Many 
emerging markets are exploring ways to improve the institutional environment in 
their markets in order to attract worldwide investment. As audit quality is an 
important factor in assessing the institutional environment of a country, policy 
makers in these markets should consider the dual audit effect and contagious effect 
of Big N international auditors when making their policies to 1m prove audit quality 
and enhance the institutional environment. 
There are additional implications from this research. The mandatory dual audit 
requirement for AB-share and AH-share firms is abolished from 2007 and 2010 
fiscal year end, respectively. Dual audit is adopted by firms only on a voluntary 
basis after the abolishment. My findings suggest that management could continue to 
have dual audit as it can enhance the credibility of the financial statements. For 
example, when a firm plans to have rights issue, management should be inclined to 
improve financial reports credibility to ensure market's responsiveness to the rights 
issue. This study provides management an alternative to improve the credibility of 
the financial reports and information transparency. 
I acknowledge several limitations on this study. First, I only used MAO and ERC to 
measure the audit quality of A-share financial statements. MAO measures auditors' 
propensity to modify audit opinions. Audit opinions are the final product of audit 
services and are tmder auditors' control. Thus, it is a direct measure of audit quality. 
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Unlike MAO which is an Accounting-Auditing based measure, ERC is a market-
based measure of audit quality. The thesis is that if the audit quality is high, the 
audited earnings should have a high impact on share value. Thus, ERC provides an 
additional evidence of audit quality in light of dual audit and contagious effects on 
audit quality. Prior literature also employs other measures as proxies for audit 
quality related to material misstatements and earnings quality, among which 
restatements of financial statements and discretionary accruals by management are 
more widely used in the literature. Restatements are the corrections of material 
misstatements in previous financial statements. Restatements indicate that auditors 
did not detect or fail to report some important issues which may affect their audit 
opinions. However, not all material misstatements could be detected and generally 
auditors and companies are reluctant to restate their financial statements. 
Furthermore, using restatements as proxies for audit quality could aggravate the 
sample size problem in my research setting especially in the contagious effect tests. 
As for the use of discretionary accruals as a measure of audit quality, Dkis known 
to have larger measurement error (Defond & Zhang, 2013). There is also a lack of 
consensus on how it should be measured. It is also affected by the different 
accounting methods chosen within GAAP. 
Second, the tests in this thesis, especially the contagious effect tests, are subject to 
the sample size limitation. As observed in the sensitivity tests, some tests are even 
not feasible due to the small sample size. Third, I do not have sufficient observations 
64 
to have pre- and post-abolishment comparison of AH share firms' audit quality 
because the dual audit requirement for AH share companies is not abolished until 
2010. For future research, dual audit effect as well as the influence of the 
abolishment may be tested when more data is available in the future. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Dependent variable 
Dependent Variable ---MAO 
Mean 
S.D. 
Number of Obs 
Pure A 
(I) 
0.061 
0.239 
13,540 
AB/H 
Non-BigN 
(2) 
0.157 
0.364 
287 
AB/H Test of Mean Difference 
BigN P-Value 
(3) (I) vs (2) (2) VS (3) 
0.099 0.0000** 0.0790* 
0.299 
172 
Notes: MAO is coded one if the sample firm-year receives a modified audit opinion in the firm's A-share financial statements, and zero otherwise. Modified 
audit opinions include unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph, qualified, disclaimer and adverse audit opinions. 
Pure A donates firms that only issue A shares and have non-Big N domestic auditors. 
AB/H (Non-BigN) are firms that issue both A shares and B (or H) shares and hire non-Big N domestic auditors and non-Big N international auditors. 
AB/H (BigN) are firms that issue both A shares and B (or H) shares and hire non-Big N domestic auditors and Big N international auditors. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B Independent Variables 
Variables Pure A AB/H (non-BigN) AB/H(BigN) Diff. Mean Diff.Mean 
(1) (2) (3) (1 )-(2) (2)-(3) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Pvalue S.D. 
SIZE 21.3850 1.0610 21.7316 1.4154 22.1771 1.2379 -0.3466*** -0.4464*** 
LEV 0.4866 0.1956 0.5754 0.1760 0.4919 0.1911 -0.0888*** 0.0839*** 
TURN 0.6713 0.5503 0.8084 0.9945 0.6352 0.5188 -0.1371 *** 0.1729** 
LOSS 0.1117 0.3151 0.2091 0.4073 0.1860 0.3903 -0.0970*** 0.0230 
ROE 0.0195 1.7954 -0.0431 0.4871 -0.0575 0.9582 0.0625 0.0146 
ARlNV 0.2820 0.1765 0.3076 0.1690 0.2800 0.1863 -0.0256** 0.0278 
AGE 7.7684 4.5637 10.7282 3.228 8.2733 3.6259 -2.9600*** 2.4201 *** 
Indep 0.3302 0.0970 0.3148 0.1109 0.3023 0.1205 0.0154*** 0.0111 
Concurrent 0.8540 0.3532 0.8502 0.3575 0.8663 0.3413 0.8575 -0.0161 
EXE 0.0440 0.2162 0.0021 0.0197 0.0008 0.0032 0.0419*** 0.0013 
SOE 0.6031 0.4820 0.8084 0.3943 0.8488 0.3593 0.0000*** -0.0405 
RET 0.0826 0.6691 -0.0792 0.4201 0.0360 0.7083 0.1619*** -0.1156** 
STDR 0.0515 0.0787 0.0478 0.0264 0.0399 0.0219 0.0036 0.0078** 
FORM 0.1267 0.3326 0.1707 0.3769 0.0349 0.1840 -0.0441 ** 0.1358*** 
Big!O 0.2231 0.4164 0.4669 0.5000 0.2326 0.4237 -0.2438*** 0.2378*** 
SWITCH 0.0970 0.2960 0.2509 0.4343 0.0698 0.2555 -0.1538*** 0.1846*** 
Industry 0.5583 0.4966 0.5436 0.4990 0.5814 0.4948 0.0147 -0.038 
Notes: *,** and *** denote significance at 0.1 0, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix I. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
MAO DUAL SIZE LEV LOSS ROE TURN ARINV In:lep Concturent AGE SOE EXE RET SIDR BiglO FORM SWITCH In:lrntry 
MAO 1.000 
DUAL 0.056 '** 1.000 
SIZE -0.160 '** 0.047 '*' 1.000 
LEV 0.169 '** 0.065 *** 0.280 ... 1.000 
LOSS 0.325 *'* 0.044 *** -0.139 ... 0.199 '** 1.000 
ROE 
-0.077 '" ·0.005 0.018 ** -0.060 *** -0.159 *** 1.000 
TURN -0.087 *** 0,035 *** 0.101 **' 0.087 *** -0.101 ... 0.023 *** 1.000 
ARINV 0.029 *** 0.021 .. -0.035 '" 0.255 *** 0.035 *** -0.019.. 0.060 *** 1.000 
Indep -0.074 *** ·0.023 ... 0.143 *** 0.048 ... -0.032 ... 0.009 0.072 '" -0.020 .. 1.000 
ConctureLrt -0.007 -0.002 0.072 ... 0.048 ... -0.001 -0.016. 0.026 ... -0.062 ... -0.053 ... 1.000 
AGE 0.047 ... 0.093 ... 0.195 ... 0.261 ... 0.064 "' 0.005 0.040 *'* 0.00 I 0.231 *'* 0.063 *** 1.000 
SOE ·0.032 *** 0.060 ... 0.203 '" 0.111 ... 0.004 -O.Oll 0.040 *'* -0.089 ... -0.125 *** 0.159 '** 0.105 ... 1.000 
EXE 
-0.035 "' -0.028 *'* 0.015 * -0.106 ... -0.046 ... 0.009 -0.006 0.053 "* 0.077 *** -0.097 *** -0.215"' -0.234 *'* 1.000 
RET -0.039 *'* -0.035 *** 0.052 "' 0.032 *** -0.085 ... 0.040 *** 0.034 *** -0.020 .. 0.044 ... 0.006 0.067 ... -0.014 -0.008 1.000 
SIDR 0.016 * -0.007 -0.028 '** 0.057 *" 0.010 0.012 O.Oll 0.017*' 0.089 "' 0.003 0,078 '" -0.042 *** -0.008 0.483 "' 1.000 
BiglO -0.030 '** 0.071 "' 0.160 ... 0.002 -0.029 *** 0.004 0.059 *** 0.016. 0.100 *** -0.008 0.050 "' -0.012 0.077 "' 0.023 '** 0.004 1.000 
FORM -O.Oll 0.019 .. 0.057 *** -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.021 .. 0.040 ... 0.045 *** -0.035 *** 0,025 ... -0.074 *** 0.061 ... -0.037 *** -0.016. 0308 ... 1.000 
SWITCH 0.072 *** 0.073 *** -0.025 *** 0.046 *** 0.047 ... -0.012 -0.035 *** 0.024 *** -0.078 *** O.Oll 0.000 0.035 ... -0.025 *'* 0.008 0.021 " 0.025 ... 0.013 1.000 
Indrntry -0.040 ... -0.004 ·O.o38 *** -0.086 *** 0.004 -0.005 0.063 ... 0.007 0.025 ... -0.032 *** -0.157 ... -0.071 **' 0.052 '" 0.007 -0.010 0.029 ... 0.004 -0.022 ... 1.000 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
This correlation matrix is based on Pearson correlation. 
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Table 3 Dual Audit Effect on MAO Based on Heckman Two-Stage Method 
Panel A First-Stage Results 
Stage one: probit estimation of firms choosing to have both A shares and B (or H) 
shares listed 
DUAL= J.lo+ J.li Sales_growth + J.1.2SIZE+ J.l3LEV+ J.l4 TURN+ J.lsROE+ J.l6LOSS 
+ J.1.1ARINV+ J.lsCASH + J.1.9Indep + J.lioConcurrent+ J.lnEXE 
+ J.1.12 Industry + J.li Year + e 
Variables Coefficients P>lzl 
Constant -6.431 0.000*** 
Sales Growth -0.011 0.504 
SIZE 0.203 0.000*** 
TURN 0.149 0.000*** 
ROE 0.026 0.400 
ARINV 0.088 0.574 
LEV 0.602 0.000*** 
LOSS 0.328 0.000*** 
CASH -0.438 0.126 
Indep 1.110 0.006*** 
Concurrent -0.116 0.125 
EXE -2.108 0.056* 
Industry 0.042 0.422 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
pseudo R-sq 9.74% 
Number of Obs 13,033 
Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit regression, estimating th< 
probability of a firm choosing to have either pure A shares or both A and B (or H) share: 
listed. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B Second-Stage Results 
MAO= ao+ UtDUAL +2:ai Control Variables +s 
Variables Expected Coefficients !-statistic P>izl Si 
Constant 3.779 6.47 0.000*** 
DUAL + 0.284 2.49 0.013** 
SIZE ? -0.276 -10.57 0.000*** 
LEV + 1.587 11.29 0.000*** 
LOSS + 0.923 17.91 0.000*** 
ROE -0.015 .. ].20 0.230 
TURN -0.254 -3.86 0.000*** 
ARINV + -0.187 -1.63 0.104 
Indep ? -0.055 -0.15 0.883 
Concurrent ? -0.034 -0.57 0.567 
EXE 0.065 0.29 0.771 
AGE ? 0.037 5.93 0.000*** 
SOE -0.137 -3.03 0.002*** 
RET -0.085 -1.72 0.085* 
STDR + 0.622 2.30 0.022** 
FORM + -0.154 -2.22 0.027** 
Big10 + 0.085 1.62 0.106 
SWITCH ? 0.257 4.38 0.000*** 
Lambda -0.041 -0.75 0.452 
Industry -0.076 -1.81 0.070* 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 12,885 
pseudo R-sq 25.36% 
Notes: This table shows the second stage estimation results of the impact of being dual 
audited by both non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors on auditors' 
propensity to issue MAOs. The dependent variable is Modified Audit Opinion (MAO) as 
defined in Appendix I. All other variables are as defined in Appendix I. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Dual Audit Effect on MAO under PSM Model 
Panel A Mean Test of Firm Characteristics 
Firm characteristics (Pure A share vs. AB/H share firms) for the propensity 
matched-pair subsample 
DUAL= J.to+ 111 Sales_growth + 112SIZE+ Jl3LEV + 14 TURN+ J.tsROE+ Jl6LOSS 
+ J.t7ARINV + J.tsCASH + Jl9lndep + J.t10Concurrent+ J.tuEXE + a 
Pure A share firm ABIH share firm Test of Mean 
. Diff. 
Firm Mean Mean P-Value Characteristics 
Sales Growth 0.2457 0.2723 0.771 
SIZE 21.6717 21.7300 0.583 
TURN 0.7701 0.7427 0.627 
ROE -0.0506 -0.0365 0.775 
ARINV 0.3114 0.3073 0.783 
LEV 0.5695 0.5737 0.782 
LOSS 0.2021 0.2128 0.689 
CASH 0.1342 0.1337 0.958 
Indep- 0.3117 0.3147 0.752 
Concurrent 0.8617 0.8511 0.719 
EXE 0.0013 0.0022 0.522 . 
N 282 282 
Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristics used in the selection 
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether a firm has both A 
share and B (or H) share listed. As shown in the t test of mean differences between the .. two 
groups, there is no difference in firm characteristics between pure A share firms and AB/H 
share firms with Non-Big4 domestic and Non-Big N international auditors. Variables are as 
defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel B Regression Results with Matched Subsample 
MAO= ao+ UtDUAL +Iuj Control Variables +s 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients t-statistic P>lzl 
Constant -0.773 -0.42 0.677 
DUAL + 0.744 3.10 0.002*** 
SIZE ? -0.114 -1.30 0.193 
LEV + 2.224 3.84 0.000*** 
LOSS + 0.197 0.85 0.395 
ROE -0.683 -3.26 0.001 *** 
TURN -0.207 -1.15 0.250 
ARINV + 1.149 2.30 0.021 ** 
AGE ? -0.057 -1.54 0.123 
lndep ? -0.078 -0.06 0.949 
Concurrent ? 0.612 1.86 0.063* 
EXE -116.428 -1.20 0.229 
SOE -0.481 -2.30 0.021 ** 
RET -0.294 -1.14 0.255 
STDR + 3.819 1.10 0.272 
FORM + 0.094 0.38 0.706 
Big10 + 0.279 1.46 0.144 
SWITCH ? 0.120 0.63 0.526 
Industry 0.195 1.18 0.239 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 564 
pseudo R-sq 34.02% 
Notes: This table shows the results of the pro bit estimation of auditors' propensity to issue 
MAOs based on the propensity matched subsample. The sample consists of 282 AB/H share 
firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors and their pure A share 
matches with non-Big N domestic auditors. All variables are as defined in Appendix. I. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and O.OOllevels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Contagious Effect on MAO based on Heckman Two-Stage Model 
Panel A First-Stage Results 
Stage one: probit estimation of AB/H firms choosing to hire Big N 
international auditors 
BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ A-2 TURN+ A3LEV+ "-4Curr+ A.sLOSSt-1 + A.6ROA+ A-7 lndep 
+A.sConcurrent + ~EXE + A.wRightst+1 + A.uMAOt-1 
+ A12 Industry+ AiYear+ £ 
Variables Coefficients P>Jzl 
Constant -7.638 0.000*** 
SIZE 0.359 0.000*** 
LEV -1.576 0.000*** 
TURN -0.341 0.011 ** 
Curr 0.882 0.017** 
ROA 0.564 0.543 
LOSSt-1 0.020 0.915 
lndep 1.142 0.213 
Concurrent 0.186 0.329 
EXE -6.135 0.387 
RightSt+1 0.566 0.231 
MAOt-1 -0.224 0.282 
Industry 0.131 0.329 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 459 
pseudo R-sq 14.65% 
Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage pro bit estimation of the probability that 
a firm chooses to hire Big N CPA firm as international auditor. The dependent variable, 
BigN, is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if an AB/H firm has a Big N international 
auditor and 0 if its international auditor is a Non-Big N CPA firm. All other variables are as 
defined in Appendix 1. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
PanelB . Second-Stage Results 
MAO= Po+ PtBigN +IPj Control Variables +s 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients t-statistic P>lzl 
Constant -24.435 -3.60 0.000*** 
BigN + -0.055 -0.24 0.812 
SIZE ? 0.913 3.18 0.001 *** 
LEV + -2.681 -2.01 0.045** 
LOSS + 0.151 0.59 0.555 
ROE -0.531 -1.94 0.052* 
TURN -1.157 -4.38 0.000*** 
ARINV + 4.301 4.99 0.000*** 
AGE ? -0.141 -2.39 0.017** 
Concurrent ? 1.387 3.24 0.001 *** 
EXE -30.109 -3.59 0.000*** 
SOE -0.401 -1.67 0.095* 
RET 0.047 0.16 0.876 
STDR + 1.590 0.44 0.660 
FORM + 0.535 1.50 0.133 
Big10 + 0.191 0.86 0.388 
SWITCH ? 0.282 1.18 0.240 
Lambda 4.057 4.19 0.000*** 
Industry 0.850 3.56 0.000*** 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 435 
pseudo R-sq 42.04% 
Notes: This table shows the results of second stage probit estimation regression for the test 
of contagious effect of Big N international auditors on the A-share audit quality. The 
dependent variable is MAO as defined in Appendix 1. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio 
estimated from the stage one probit estimation. All independent variables are as defined in 
Appendix 1. 
Variable Indep is omitted from this regression due to its high correlation with one year 
dummy. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Contagious Effect on MAO Based on PSM Model 
Panel A Mean Difference Test of Firm Characteristics 
Firm Characteristics Partitioned by the international auditor type for the 
propensity matched-pair subsarnple 
BigN= J.o+ A.1SIZE+ A.2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ ""Curr+ A.sLOSS1.1 + A.6ROA+ /..1 Indep 
+A.gConcurrent + "-9EXE + A.10Rights1+1 + A.IIMA01.J+ e 
Pure A share firm AB/H share firm Test of Mean Diff. 
Firm Mean Mean P-Value Characteristics 
SIZE 22.0972 22.1746 0.713 
LEV 0.5221 0.5238 0.543 
TURN 0.6471 0.6895 0.947 
Curr 0.4894 0.5008 0.727 
ROA 0.0222 0.0294 0.410 
LOSS1.1 0.1446 0.1566 0.830 
Indep 0.3087 0.3205 0.471 
Concurrent 0.9036 0.8675 0.468 
EXE 0.0002 0.0009 0.148 
RightSt+l 0.0120 0.0120 1.000 
MA01.1 0.1325 0.0964 0.468 
N 83 83 
Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristic specified in the 
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether an AB/H share 
firm hire Big N international auditor or hire non-Big N international auditor. As shown in 
the t test of mean differences between the two groups, there is no difference in firm 
characteristics between AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N 
international auditors and AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and Big N 
international auditors in the matched subsample. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix I. 
75 
Table 6 (Continued) 
Panel B Regression Results with Matched Subsample 
MAO= ~o+ ~1BigN + L~j Control Variables +e 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients t-statistic P>lzl 
Constant -6.819 -1.02 0.308 
BigN + -0.798 -1.41 0.157 
SIZE ? 0.228 0.76 0.447 
LEV + -0.562 -0.30 0.767 
LOSS + -0.855 -1.34 0.180 
ROE -0.537 -2.56 0.011 ** 
TURN -0.003 -0.01 0.992 
ARINV + 6.447 4.42 0.000*** 
AGE ? -0.045 -0.45 0.653 
Concurrent ? 0.596 0.82 0.410 
EXE -338.538 -0.48 0.631 
SOE -0.870 -1.52 0.127 
RET -1.401 -1.02 0.306 
STDR + 1.372 0.10 0.921 
FORM + 0.850 0.92 0.358 
Big10 + 0.453 0.88 0.379 
SWITCH ? 0.511 0.85 0.395 
Industry -0.512 -1.22 0.221 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 166 
pseudo R- 45.19% 
sq 
Notes: This table shows the results of contagious effect on auditors' propensity to issm 
MAOs based on the propensity-matched subsample. The subsample consists of 83 AB/f 
share firms with non-Big N domestic auditor and Big N international auditor and their AB/f 
share matches which hire non-Big N domestic auditors and non-Big N international auditor: 
The dependent variable is MAO. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Dual Audit Effect on ERC Based on Heckman Two-Stage Method 
Panel A First-Stage Results 
Stage one: pro bit estimation of firms choosing to have both A shares and B (or H) 
shares listed 
DUAL= ~o+ ~~ Sales_growth + ~2SIZE+ ~3LEV+ ~4 TURN+ ~sROE+ ~6LOSS 
+ ~7ARINV+ ~sCASH + ~9Indep + ~10Concurrent+ ~uEXE 
+ ~12 Industry+ ~i Year+ E 
Variables Coefficients P>lzl 
Constant -7.346 0.000*** 
Sales Growth -0.010 0.394 
SIZE 0.253 0.000*** 
TURN 0.206 0.000*** 
ROE -0.977 0.054* 
ARINV 0.175 0.276 
LEV 0.358 0.048** 
LOSS 0.166 0.099* 
CASH -0.497 0.096* 
Indep 1.022 0.014** 
Concurrent -0.158 0.039** 
EXE -1.911 0.070* 
Industry 0.033 0.542 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
pseudo R-sq 10.76% 
Number of Obs 12,984 
Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit regression, estimating the 
probability of a firm choosing to have either pure A shares or both A and B (or H) shares 
listed. The variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
*, ** and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Second-Stage Results 
CAR=yo+y1flE + Y2DUAL+y3flE* DUAL+2)j Control Variables +s 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients t-statistic P>lzl 
Constant 2.243 3.84 0.000*** 
tlE + 0.685 6.95 0.000*** 
DUAL + 0.038 1.23 0.218 
flE*DUAL + 0.493 1.79 0.074* 
SIZE ? -0.090 -4.45 0.000*** 
LEV 0.002 0.03 0.975 
CURRENT + 0.002 1.22 0.222 
BV + 0.019 5.32 0.000*** 
GROWTH 0.0003 0.79 0.430 
Indep + -0.079 -0.78 0.434 
Concurrent + 0.017 1.02 0.310 
EXE + 0.235 2.04 0.042** 
SOE 0.016 1.09 0.277 
STDR '-7.081 -2.96 0.003*** 
FORM + -0.005 -0.27 0.785 
Big10 + 0.011 0.87 0.384 
SWITCH ? 0.013 0.69 0.490 
Lambda -0.131 -2.12 0.034** 
Industry 0.014 1.18 0.237 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 12,983 
Rz 10.81% 
adjusted R2 10.6% 
Notes: This table shows the results of the second stage regression for the dual audit effect 
on firm's earnings response coefficient. The dependent variable is CAR, cumulative 
abnormal return, cumulate the weekly abnormal return from month -8 to month 4, where the 
fiscal year end is month 0, calculated as CAR=L log(l +Rica-~Rm1). All other variables are 
as defined in Appendix 1. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and O.OOllevels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Dual Audit Effect on ERC under PSM Model 
Panel A .Mean Test of Firm Characteristics 
Firm characteristics (Pure A share vs. AB/H share firms) for the propensity 
matched-pair subsample 
DUAL= f!O+ !!I Sales_growth + J.LzSIZE+ J!JLEV + 14 TURN+ J.LsROE+ J!6LOSS 
+ J.1.1ARINV + J.LsCASH + J!9lndep + J.1.10Concurrent+ !!11EXE + c 
Pure A share firm AB/H share firm TestofMean 
Diff. 
Firm Mean Mean P-Value Characteristics 
Sales_ Growth 0.1082 0.0924 0.520 
SIZE 21.9023 21.8160 0.457 
TURN 0.7870 0.7620 0.674 
ROE 0.0138 0.0057 0.235 
ARINV 0.3048 0.3130 0.599 
LEV 0.5504 0.5701 0.203 
LOSS 0.1617 0.1955 0.309 
CASH 0.1312 0.1327 0.847 
Indep 0.3199 0.3122 0.414 
Concurrent 0.7669 0.8421 0.029** 
EXE 0.0021 0.0023 0.908 
N 266 266 
Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristics used in the selection 
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether a firm has both A 
share and B (or H) shares listed. As shown in the t test of mean differences between the ·two 
groups, there is no difference in firm characteristics between pure A share firms and ABIH 
share firms with non-Big4 domestic and non-Big N international auditors except Concurrent. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix l. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression Results with Matched Subsample 
CAR=yo+ytfi.E + y2DUAL+y3 /I.E* DUAL+I;yj Control Variables +s 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients t-statistics P>/z/ 
Constant 1.204 2.27 0.024** 
/I.E + 0.044 0.15 0.882 
DUAL + 0.050 0.97 0.333 
fi.E*DUAL + 1.072 2.80 0.005*** 
SIZE ? -0.067 -2.60 0.010** 
LEV 0.376 2.05 0.041 ** 
CURRENT + 0.021 0.59 0.555 
BV + 0.013 1.03 0.302 
GROWTH -0.0001 -0.44 0.660 
Indep + -0.431 -1.01 0.311 
Concurrent + 0.030 0.51 0.610 
EXE + 0.135 0.16 0.876 
SOE 0.084 1.42 0.157 
STDR -4.320 -1.82 0.069* 
FORM + -0.029 -0.53 0.594 
Big10 + -0.006 -0.11 0.915 
SWITCH ? -0.020 -0.39 0.698 
Industry -0.046 -1.14 0.254 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 532 
R2 8.77% 
adjusted R.'- 3.7% 
Notes: This table shows the results of dual audit on the earning response coefficient based 
on the propensity-matched subsample. The subsample consists of 266 AB/H share firms 
which hire non-Big N domestic auditor and non-Big N international auditor and their pure A 
matches who only hire non-Big N domestic auditor. The dependent variable is CAR, 
cumulative abnormal return. Other variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and O.OO!levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 Contagious Effect on ERC Based on Heckman Two-Stage Model 
Panel A First-Stage Results 
Stage one: probit estimation of AB/H firms choosing to hire Big N 
international auditors 
BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ /...2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ A.4Curr+ A.sLOSSt-1 + A.6ROA+ A.7 Indep 
+A.sConcurrent + /...gEXE + A.10Rightst+1 + A.11MAOt-1 
+ /...12 Industry+ AiYear+ c 
Variables Coefficients P>lzl 
Constant -7.638 0.000*** 
SIZE 0.352 0.000*** 
LEV -1.912 0.000*** 
TURN -0.271 0.037** 
Curr 1.020 0.010** 
ROA 0.417 0.674 
LOSSt-1 -0.009 0.967 
Indep 1.013 0.318 
Concurrent 0.273 0.188 
EXE -8.552 0.506 
RightSt-1 0.303 0.567 
MAOt-1 -0.312 0.162 
Industry 0.088 0.535 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 423 
pseudo R-sq 15.81% 
Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit estimation of the probability that 
a firm chooses to hire a Big N CPA firm as international auditor. The dependent variable, 
BigN, is an indicator variable set equal to I if an AB/H firm has a Big N international 
auditor and 0 if its international auditor is a Non-Big N CPA firm. All other variables are as 
defined in Appendix 1. 
* ,** and *** denote significance at 0.1 0, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Panel B Second-Stage Regression Results 
CAR=oo+od'>E + ozBigN+o3Ll.E* BigN+Z:oj Control Variables +s 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients t-statistics P>[z[ 
Constant 0.181 0.21 0.837 
Ll.E + 0.419 2.06 0.040** 
BigN + 0.014 0.26 0.796 
Ll.E*BigN + 0.665 1.77 . 0.077* 
SIZE ? -0.006 -0.15 0.881 
LEV 0.003 0.():2 0.987 
CURRENT + -0.012 -0.39 0.699 
BV + 0.003 0.21 0.831 
GROWTH -0.0008 -0.69 0.493 
Indep + -0.162 -0.56 0.579 
Concurrent + -0.008 -0.12 0.906 
EXE + -0.620 -0.54 0.586. 
SOE -0.018 -0.33 0.745 
STDR 0.122 0.11 0.912 
FORM + 0.029 0.51 0.612 
Big10 + 0.038 0.79 0.429 
SWITCH ? -0.011 -0.19 0.847 
Lambda 0.017 0.15 0.880 
Industry -0.017 -0.37 0.711 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 423 
Rz 11.45% 
adjusted R2 4.9% 
Notes: This table shows the results of second stage regression for test of contagious effect of 
Big N international auditors on the A-share audit quality. The dependent variable is CAR as 
defined in Appendix I. All independent variables are defined in Appendix I. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 Contagious Effect on ERC Based on PSM Method 
Panel A Mean Difference Test of Firm Characteristics 
Firm Characteristics Partitioned by the international auditor type for the propensity 
matched-pair subsample 
BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ A.2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ '-4Curr+ A.sLosst-r+ A.6ROA+ A.1 Indep 
+A.sConcurrent + ~EXE + A.wRightst+1 + A.11MAOt-1+ s 
Pure A share firm AB/H share firm Test of Mean Diff. 
Firm Mean Mean P-Value Characteristics 
SIZE 21.9416 22.0817 0.489 
LEV 0.5342 0.5364 0.936 
TURN 0.7112 0.6417 0.325 
Curr 0.5404 0.4902 0.149 
ROA 0.0161 0.0286 0.255 
LOSSt-1 0.1944 0.1667 0.667 
Indep 0.3146 0.3072 0.695 
Concurrent 0.9028 0.8889 0.787 
EXE 0.0070 0.0050 0.789 
RightSt+1 0.0417 0.0278 0.652 
MAOt-1 0.1389 0.1111 0.617 
N 72 72 
Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristics specified in the 
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether an AB/H share 
firm hire international auditor or hire non-Big N international auditor. As shown in the t test 
of mean differences between the two groups, there is no difference in firm characteristics 
between AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors 
and AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and Big N international auditors in the 
matched subsample. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B Regression Results with Matched Subsample 
CAR=8o+81~E+~hBigN +83~E* BigN+I8j Control Variables +e 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients t-statistics P>lzl 
Constant 0.176 0.14 0.890 
1:\E + -0.094 -0.14 0.885 
BigN + 0.023 0.20 0.842 
1:\E*BigN + 1.483 2.01 0.047** 
SIZE ? 0.001 0.02 0.981 
LEV -0.019 -0.06 0.955 
CURRENT + 0.164 1.54 0.127 
BV + -0.019 -0.75 0.453 
GROWTH -0.001 -0.12 0.907 
Indep + 0.048 0.08 0.938 
Concurrent + 0.007 0.05 0.960 
EXE + 11.800 1.27 0.207 
SOE -0.240 -1.98 0.050* 
STDR -2.494 -0.94 0.349 
FORM + 0.027 0.17 0.867 
Big10 + 0.047 0.41 0.679 
SWITCH ? -0.011 -0.08 0.938 
Industry -0.094 -1.18 0.242 
YEAR Included, but not reported for brevity 
N 144 
R2 20.38% 
adjusted R2 1.0% 
Notes: This table shows the results of contagious effect on earnings response coefficient 
based on the propensity-matched subsample. The subsample consists of 72 AB/H share 
firms with non-Big N domestic auditor and Big N international auditor and their AB/H share 
matches which hire non-Big N domestic auditor and non-Big N international auditor .. The 
dependent variable is CAR. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001levels, respectively 
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Table 11 Summary of Results 
Results of Main Tests 
Regression # 
Reference Dependent Selection Method Effect Tested Expectation Empirical Results 
Table Variable 
Sign Significance 
1 3 MAO Heckman two-stage Dual audit positive positive 5% level 
2 4 MAO PSM Dual audit positive positive 1% level 
3 5 MAO Heckman two-stage Contagious positive negative insignificant 
4 6 MAO PSM Contagious positive positive insignificant 
5 7 ERC Heckman two-stage Dual audit positive positive 10% level 
6 8 ERC PSM Dual audit positive positive 1% level 
7 9 ERC Heckman two-stage Contagious positive positive 10% level 
8 10 ERC PSM Contagious positive positive 5% level 
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Table 12 Sensitivity Tests 
Panel A Alternative Definition of MAO 
Effect Tested Selection Method Test variable Empirical Results Main test results 
Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl 
Dual audit Heckman two-stage DUAL 0.2042 0.057*• 0.284 0.013** 
Dual audit PSM DUAL 0.6652 0.004*** 0.744 0.002*** 
Contagious Heckman two-stage BigN -0.0258 0.906 -0.055 0.812 
Contagious PSM BigN -0.5035 0.352 -0.798 0.157 
Panel B Alternative Measure of CAR---CAR2 
Effect Tested Selection Method Test variable Empirical Results Main test results 
Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl 
Dual audit Heckman two-stage t1E*DUAL 0.3181 0.039** 0.493 0.074* 
Dual audit PSM t1E*DUAL 0.1435 0.597 1.072 0.005*** 
Contagious Heckman two-stage t1E*BigN 0.8648 0.019** 0.665 0.077* 
Contagious PSM t1E*BigN 1.2466 0.056* 1.483 0.047** 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Panel C Mandatory dual audit only 
Regression Dependent Selection Method Effect Tested Expectation Empirical Results Main Test Results 
# Variable 
Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
1 MAO Heckman two~stage Dual audit positive 0.3200 0.007*** 0.284 0.013** 
2 MAO PSM Dual audit positive 0.9739 0.001 *** 0.744 0.002*** 
3 MAO Heckman two~stage Contagious positive -0.0055 0.981 -0.055 0.812 
4 MAO PSM Contagious positive NIA NIA -0.798 0.157 
5 ERC Heckman two-stage Dual audit positive 0.5784 0.036** 0.493 0.074* 
6 ERC PSM Dual audit positive 0.2306 0.644 1.072 0.005*** 
7 ERC Heckman two-stage Contagious positive 0.7595 0.075* 0.665 0.077* 
8 ERC PSM Contagious positive 1.0074 0.337 1.483 0.047** 
Panel D AB dual audit only 
Regression Dependent Selection Method Effect Tested Expectation Empirical Results Main Test Results 
# Variable 
Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
1 MAO Heckman two-stage Dual audit positive 0.2653 0.039** 0.284 0.013** 
2 MAO PSM Dual audit positive 0.5865 0.050** 0.744 0.002*** 
" MAO Heckman two-stage Contagious positive -0.1478 0.581 -0.055 0.812 .) 
4 MAO PSM Contagious positive NIA N/A -0.798 0.157 
5 ERC Heckman two-stage Dual audit positive 0.6822 0.038** 0.493 0.074* 
6 ERC PSM Dual audit positive -0.1813 0.840 1.072 0.005*** 
7 ERC Heckman two-stage Contagious positive 0.9661 0.044** 0.665 0.077* 
8 ERC PSM Contagious positive 1.1625 0.360 1.483 0.047** 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Panel E Pre- and Post-Abolishment Period Comparison 
Dependent Variable 
MAO 
ERC 
Independent Variable 
POST 
~E*POST 
Expectation 
Negative 
Negative 
Coefficient 
-1.4156 
0.5000 
Notes: 1. MAO represents modified audit opinions and ERC represents earnings response coefficient. 
2. Heckman two-stage is Heckman two-stage selection model. PSM is propensity score matching method. 
3. N/ A means the test is not feasible due to the limitation of sample size. 
4. *,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively 
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Pvalue 
0.014** 
0.234 
Figure 1 Research Design for Empirical Results 
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Appendix 1 
Variable 
AGE 
ARINV 
Big10 
BigN 
BV 
CAR 
CASH 
Concurrent 
Curr 
CURRENT 
DUAL 
EXE 
FORM 
Growth 
Indep 
Industry 
Lambda 
LEV 
LOSS 
MAO 
RET 
Rights 
ROA 
Variable Definitions 
Definition 
The number of years a company has been listed 
Sum of accounts receivable and inventory divided by total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year 
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm's A-share 
financial statement is audited by one of the Big10 CPA 
firms (based on CICPA annual ranking), otherwise 0 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the international auditor 
is one ofthe BigN CPA firms, otherwise 0 
The book value of equity per share at the end of fiscal year 
The cumulative abnormal return 
The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the 
end of fiscal year 
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the CEO and board 
chairman are different persons, otherwise 0 
The ratio of current assets to total assets at the end of fiscal 
year 
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the end of 
fiscal year 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is audited by 
both domestic and international auditors, otherwise 0 
Percentage of shares held by executives 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the auditor bears 
unlimited liability in audit failure, otherwise 0 
The market-to-book ratio at the end of fiscal year 
Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a company is in 
manufacturing industry and for a non-manufacturing 
company 
The inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman two-stage model 
The ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the net income in the 
fiscal year is less than zero, otherwise 0. 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm receives modified 
audit opinion for its A-share financial statement, otherwise 0 
The annual market-adjusted stock returns 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm have a rights 
issue, otherwise 0 
The ratio of year-end net income to total assets 
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ROE 
Sales Growth 
SIZE 
SOE 
STDR 
SWITCH 
TURN 
~E 
The ratio of year-end net income to shareholders' equity 
The percentage change in annual sales 
The nature logarithm of year-end total assets 
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm is ultimately 
controlled by the government, and 0 otherwise 
The standard deviation of residuals from the market model 
estimated by weekly return data during the year 
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the firm changes its 
auditor in the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
The ratio of year-end sales to total assets 
The change in the annual earnings deflated by the firm's 
market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year 
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Report 3 B-Share Audit Report of AB-share Firm 
(stock code: 000017, 2006 audit report) 
INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT. 
BASIS FOR QUALIFIED OPINION 
Scope limitation- Liabilities in respect of corporate guarantees 
As disclosed in note 18 to the consolidated financial statements, the Group has ·not provided 
contingent liabilities for its subsidiaries, associates and related companies amounting to 
RMB25,271,000 as at 31 December 2006. We were not provided with sufficient audit evidence to 
determine the completeness of the corporate guarantee entered into by the subsidiaries, associates 
and related companies. Therefore, we were unable to satisfy ourselves on the completeness of 
contingent liabilities disclosed as at 31 December 2006 nor had obtained adequate information to 
assess the completeness of liabilities of the Group in providing the corporate guarantees. 
Consequently, we were unable to determine whether the contingent liabilities had been properly 
disclosed and provided for in the financial statements. 
Disclaimer opinion -liabilities 
As disclosed in notes 1 and 28 to the consolidated financial statements, the Group is under 
refinance and restructure process and has not yet completed. According to the confirmations 
received from the bankers and financial institutes, the Group's accrued interest was 
understated in amounting to RMB199,669,982.39. Up to the date of this report, the Group has 
not yet agreed the interest elements with the bankers and financial institutes. Adjustment has 
not recorded by the Group and we were unable to express our opinion to whether the liabilities 
of the Group was correctly recorded as at 31 December 2006. 
4. Disclaimer opinion- interest in an associate and accounting treatment 
As disclosed in note 10 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company invested 39.83% 
in Jiang Xi Li Hua Enterprises Limited ("Li Hua"). According to the share register of Li Hua, 
the shareholder of investment in 39.83% should be Hong Kong (Link) Bicycles Limited. 
Therefore, we were unable to express our opinion as to whether the Company has equity right 
in Li Hua and the recoverability of the net carrying amount of investment in Li Hua in 
amounting to RMB26,879,903.07. 
We were unable to carry out alternative audit procedures to satisfy ourselves as to the· matters 
set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 above. 
Any adjustment that might have been found to be necessary in respect of the matters set out 
above would have a consequential effect on the financial positions of the Group as at 31 
December 2006, the net loss and cash flows of the Group for the year then ended and the 
related disclosures in the consolidated financial statements. 
QUALIFICATION ARISING FROM MATERIAL UNCERTAINTIES RELATING TO 
THE GOING CONCERN BASIS 
In forming our opinion, we have considered the adequacy of the disclosure made in note 1(b) to 
the consolidated financial statements which describes the liquidity issues and financial 
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difficulties experienced by tbe Group and the steps undertaken by the Group to ensure the 
Group is able to continue as going concern. As described in note 20 to the consolidated 
financial statements that concerning the overdue bank borrowings as at 31 December 2006, the 
Group has outstanding borrowings of approximately RMB523,309,000 due to various banks 
plus accrued interest which is still under disp11tes. All these amounts were overdue and the 
Company is still in the process to re-negotiate the payment terms and dates with the lenders. 
The Group's adoption of going concern basis is based on the successful outcome of the debt 
restructuring as well as the resulting improvemtent in the financial position of the Group. It is 
uncertain at this stage whether and how the <Group can be able to repay the overdue bank 
borrowings and other payables. 
The consolidated financial statements have been prepared on a going concern basis, the validity 
of which depends upon the attainment of profitable and positive cash flow operations, the 
restructuring/refinancing of its debts, the continuing financial support of its bankers and the 
successful outcome of the steps undertaken :as described in note 1(b) to the consolidated 
financial statements to ensure the Group is able to continue as going concern. The consolidated 
financial statements do not include any adjustments that would result from a failure to obtain 
such financial support. We consider that appropriate disclosures have been made. However, in 
view of the extent of the material uncertainties relating to the steps mentioned above that may 
cast significant doubt on the Group's ability to •continue as a going concern, we have disclaimed 
our opinion. The consolidated financial statements do not include any adjustments that would 
be necessary if the various steps as described above fail to obtain. Any adjustment to the 
consolidated financial statements may have a c•msequential significant effect on the loss for the 
year and net liabilities as at 31 December 2006. 
DISCLAIMER OF OPINION DiSCLAIMER ON VIEW GIVEN BY 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
Because of the significance of the matters describ(:d in the basis for disclaimer of opinion section and 
the material uncertainties relating to the going co~ncern basis as set out above, we do not express an 
opinion on the financial statements as to whether they give a true and fair view of the state of affairs 
of the Group as at 31 December 2006 and of the loss and cash flows of the Group for the year then 
ended in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. 
For and on behalf of 
Wong Lam Leung & K wok C.P.A. Limited 
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